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Contempt: Sacrilege in the
Judicial Temple-
the Derivative Political Trial
By DONALD H. J. H*
"Introibo ad atare... ." "Oyez, Oyez, Oyez, All Persons having
business .... " A hush fills the crowded room as the spectators
ritualistically rise from their places in the hardwood pews which
are tightly fastened to the floor. The attendants have taken their
respective places; the subject of this solemn event stands beside
those who will personally minister on his behalf during the per-
formance of the ritual. Suddenly from a door behind an elevated
table, much like the altar of Melchizedek, emerges the celebrant
garbed distinctively in black robes. The gavel falls; the scene is
complete for the start of a political trial.
I. THE PorAcAL T _AL
There is in the United States a general refusal to recognize
the existence of political trials.' It is argued that while all trials
* Associate Professor of Law, De Paul University; A.B. 1965, Stanford
University; J.D. 1968, Columbia University.
1 See 0. Kmcmmmn, POrrcAL JusTIcE (1961) [hereinafter referred to
as KmcHrmrnm]. Kirchheimer, late Professor of Government at Columbia Univer-
sity, presented a convincing exposition of the existence of political trials:
[M]any a jurist is likely to deny that there is such a thing as a
political trial; to say that the thing exists and often entails consequences
of importance is in the eyes of such men of Law Immaculate, equivalent
to questioning the integrity of the courts, the morals of the legal srofes-
sion. These standard-bearers of innocence are apt to conten that
where there is respect for law, only those who have committed offenses
punishable under existing statutes are prosecuted; that alleged offenders
are tried under specific rules determining how to tell truth from falsehood
in the charges preferred; and that intercession of political motivations or
aspirations is ruled out by time-honored and generally recognized trial
standards which guide administration of justice among civilized or, to use
a new more popular term, freenations. Id. at 47.
In a political trial all this has a different complexion. The judicial
machinery and its trial mechanics are set into motion to attain political
objectives which transcend both the bystanders' curiosity and the govern-
mental custodian's satisfaction in the vindication of the political order.
Court action is called upon to exert influence on the distribution of politi-(Continued on next page)
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may be "political" in the sense that the courts and other official
agencies are political institutions which function to preserve order,
resolve disputes and sanction private actions, there are, neverthe-
less, no "political trials" in the sense that individuals are tried for
political action or belief.2 This argument stems from the belief
that constitutional freedoms such as freedom of speech and
assembly permit full exercise of political freedom and that the
courts are precluded from encroachment on political freedom.
The immediate response to this is that all constitutional freedoms
are subject to judicial restriction and this has been the case even
with such "preferred freedoms" as speech and assembly.3 More-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
cal power. The objectives may be to upset-fray, undermine, or destroy
-existing power positions, or to strengthen efforts directed at their
preservation. Again, efforts to maintain the status quo may be essentially
symbolic, or they may specifically hit at potential or full-grown existing
adversaries. Sometimes it may be doubtful whether such court action
really does consolidate the established structure; it may weaken it. Yet
that it is in both cases aimed at affecting power relations in one way or
another denotes the essence of a political trial. id. at 49.
But see, K. DOLBEARE AND J. GROSSMAN, LeRoi Jones in Newark: A Political Trial?
in T. BEc E, PoLrricAL TwnAs 244 (1971):
Perhaps we should modify our definition to say that a "political trial"
is merely one which is marked by one or more of the authoritative actors
failing to perform the social control ritual within the range of "norms"
for such behavior. The difference is in the style and procedure, not in
the substance of what is being done, and this is the real distinguishing
feature of political justice.2 See J. LuKcAs, THE BARvA~n Eprrr Am Onim Oscmr=rn : Nomrs ON
THE CHICAcO CONSPIRcY TkuA 74 (1970) citing the record in the Chicago Con-
spiracy trial:
THE COURT: This is not a political case as far as I am concerned.
MR. KUNSTLER: Well, Your Honor, as far as some of the rest of us
are concerned, it is quite a political case.
THE COURT: It is a criminal case. There is an indictment here. I have
the indictment right up here. I can't go into politics here in this
court.
MR. KUNSTLER: Your Honor, Jesus was accused criminally too, and we
understand really that was not truly a criminal case in the sense
that it is just an ordinary-
THE COURT: I didn't live back at that time. I don't know. Some people
think I go back that far, but I really don't.
MR. KUNSTLER: Well, I was assuming Your Honor had read of the
incident.
3 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), where the defendants
were indicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 for sending to draftees a pamphlet
quoting the thirteenth amendment and urging that readers of the leaflet resist
the draft to "Assert Your Rights. ... If you do not assert and su port your rights
you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all
citizens and residents of the United States to retain." Mr. Justice Holmes delivering
the opinion of the Court formulated the now famous "clear and present danger
test.
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
(Continued on next page)
1972] CONTEMPT
over, it cannot be denied that a crime such as treason is in
essence a political crime and that a trial for this crime is of neces-
sity a "political trial."4 While political trials usually involve crimi-
nal prosecutions, it is possible for a political trial to take on the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by
any constitutional right. 249 U.S. at 52.
The latitude in degree of danger which might be sufficiently "clear and present"
to suppress the exercise of freedom of speech or of the press was revealed in
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), where Mr. Justice Holmes, again
delivering the opinion of the Court, did not require that there be any actual
interference with the draft nor that literature or speech even reach a draftee or
draft eligible man:
[W]e must take the case on the record as it is, and on that record it is
impossible to say that it might not have been found that the circulation of
the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle
a flame and that the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent
the paper out. 249 U.S. at 209.
See also Abrahams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schaefer v. United States,
251 U.S. 466 (1920); and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) in which Mr.
Justice Holmes dissented in the application of the "clear and present danger test"
to specific fact situations. In his dissent in Gitlow, Holmes observed:
If what I think the correct test is applied, it is manifest that there was
no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on
the part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant's
views. It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was
an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief
and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or
some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only
difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in
the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence
may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant
discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration.
If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the
only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
andhave their way. 268 U.S. at 673.
See generally F. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
and the Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58
J. Am. HIST. 24 (1971). But see Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), reversing a conviction of a Ku Klux
Klan leader under a state criminal syndicalism statute. Douglas argues against the
maintenance of the "clear and present danger" test: "Though I doubt if the 'clear
and present danger test is congenial to the First Amendment in time of declared
war, I am certain it is not reconcilable- with the First Amendment in days of
peace." 395 U.S. at 444.
4 See J. W. HursT, THE LAw OF TREAsoN IN THE UNrr=o STATES: CoLI Cra
EssA.zs (1971). Hurst provides a definition of "treason" which reveals its core
political element:
Treason is the betrayal of allegiance owed a political sovereign either
because of citizenship or because of acceptance of the protection of
laws .... The crime is the most serious against the safety of the state;
but, by the same token, the stigma it carries, and the vagueness of its
reach have made it a notorious instrument of arbitrary power and political
faction. Id. at 14-15.
See also J. Ancnma, TREAsON iN AMERucA: DISLOYALTY vERsus DissENT (1971).
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form of a civil suit.5 The derivative political trial taking the form
of a civil suit is exemplified by the trial of Alger Hiss who,
although accused of espionage and ultimately convicted of perjury
was himself the plaintiff in a defamation suit he initiated against
Whittaker Chambers for statements made by Chambers outside
the immunity granted by Congress.6 With treason and espionage,
we have clearly recognizable political crimes which are specifically
provided for in penal codes; conspiracy and incitement provide
examples of broader criminal charges which are used for purposes
of political prosecution. 7 These latter offenses sweep broadly and
permit prosecutions where "there is a meeting of the minds" even
though there is no substantial activity on the part of those ac-
cused.8 The exercise of prosecutorial discretion may provide the
occasion for a political trial; when a political motive is the com-
pelling factor in the decision to prosecute, an apparently routine
criminal prosecution is converted into a political trial. Finally,
r See KmcIrmMEnv, supra note 1, at 46-53.
o United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (1950). See generally A. COOE, A
GENERATION ON TrAL: U.S.A. V. ALGER HISS (1950).
7 See D.N. Pr=r, LAw, CLASS AND SociEr-BooK III: LAw AND Porrcs
ANM LAw IN THE COLONIES 16-19 (Lawrence and Wishart, London; 1971). Pritt
writes generally of political trials in English speaking courts, and observes that the
use of "conspiracy' and "riot' are easily adapted to the purposes of the political
prosecution:
I will take next the group of offenses called "unlawful assembly, rout,
and riot," which were long important in times of industrial trouble, and
are still of some importance, and likely to increase in importance, since
political demonstrations are growing more frequent and are regularly
broken up by the police, with prosecutions to follow....
It is easy to see how almost any joint action, peaceful or violent, by
even a small number of people, for a political or any other purpose, can
be charged as a conspiracy. Progressive judges, politicians and supporters
of civil liberty in all countries applying the principles of English law have
long protested against the use of charges of conspiracy to secure the
conviction and imprisonment of persons against whom no specific offense
could possibly be proved; but governments have continued to use this
formidable and easy weapon....
8 See generall! Wechsler Jones and Kom, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes
in the ModeI Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and
Conspiracy, 61 COL. LAW lR'v. 571-628, 957-1030 (1961):
Putting aside such special grievances as those based on the early
condemnation of the labor union as a criminal conspiracy, and the use
of the charge against political offenders, the general critique has pointed
to the danger of a dragnet in the broad, uncertain ground of liability, the
wholesale joinder of defendants, the imposition of vicarious responsi-
bilit , the relaxation of the rules of evidence, or some or all of these in
combination. Id. at 957-58.
9 Selective enforcement of any law where discretion is used to achieve a
political purpose creates a political trial. The problem of politically motivated
enforcement is illustrated in F.H. Heussenstamm, Bumper Stickers and the Cops,
TRANSACTION 32-33 (February 1971). Fifteen subjects, with exemplary driver(Continued on next page)
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perjury and contempt may be the occasion for derivative political
trials, where the original indictment theory fails and conviction is
obtained on a charge of perjury or contempt growing out of the
original trial.'0
In order to obtain an understanding of a political trial, it is
useful to examine the basis and objective of the prosecution of
such cases. The state initiates such trials in order to punish and
deter individuals from certain political acts such as treason or
draft evasion which are political crimes and which are considered
to be threatening to the existing political authority; or because
the state wishes to make an example of the defendant, by selective
enforcement of the law, in order to discourage the defendant
and others from engaging in political activities. 1 It can be argued
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
records, participated in an experiment involving the driving of automobiles with
"bumper stickers in lurid day-glo orange and black, depicting a menacing
panther with large BLACK PANTHER lettering" attached to the rear bumper of
each subject car. Heussenstamm reports:
The first student [subject] received a ticket for making an "incorrect
lane change" on the freeway less than two hours after heading home in
the rush hour traffic. Five more tickets were received by others on the
second day for "following too closely", "failing to yield the right of
way", "driving too slowly in the high-speed lane of the freeway", "failure
to make a proper signal before turning right at an intersection and
"failure to observe proper safety of pedestrians using a crosswalk.' On
day three, students were cited for 'excessive speed", "making unsafe
lane changes" and "driving erratically", and so it went every day.
One student was forced to drop out of the study by day four
because he had already received three citations. Three others reached
what we had agreed vas the maximum limit-three citations within the
first week. Altogether the participants received 38 citations in 17 days,
and the violation fund was exhausted.
Heussenstamm concludes:
It is possible, of course, that the subject's bias influenced his driving,
making it less circumspect than usual. But it is unlikely that this number
of previously "safe" drivers could amass such a collection of tickets with-
out assuming real bias by police against drivers with Black Panther
bumper stickers. Id. at 83.
10 See text accompanying notes 39-44, infra. This problem is not unique to
the United States, see International Herald Tribune, March 25, 1972, at 5, col. 2,
where at a meeting of the Madrid Bar Association it is reported:
Lawyers have complained that they have been held in contempt of court
for what they considered legitimate defense tactics, and that they were
ruled out of order when questioning defendants on details of their arrest
or treatment [in political cases].
11 The purposes of the political trial have been categorized by reference to the
type of offense charged. See KwcEHaEm , supra note 1, at 46, where the political
trial is analyzed as falling into three principal categories:
A. The trial involving a common crime committed for political purposes
and conducted with a view to the political benefits which might
ultimately accrue from a successful prosecution;
B. The classic political trial: a regimes attempt to incriminate its foe's
(Continued on next page)
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that all individuals from disadvantaged socio-economic back-
grounds suffer unequal treatment before the law and hence are
oppressed and victimized by judicial proceedings."2 However, a
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
public behavior with a view to evicting him from the political scene;
and
C. The derivative political trial, where the weapons of defamation, per-
jury and contempt are manipulated in an effort to bring disrepute
upon a political foe. [emphasis added].
See also T. BECxER, PoLrricAL TnIALs (1971), where Becker observes that: "In a
sense, all trials are political. Since courts are government agencies... .; but
finds that the peculiar element which differentiates trials is a "perception of a direct
threat to established political power" and this "is a major difference between
political trials and other trials. Id. at xi. Given the existence of political trials,
Becker finds them to be of four types:
1. Those cases where the nature of the crime is clearly political and the
impartiality of the judge applying the* law is not called into serious
question.
2. Cases where the indictment is clearly political but the impartiality
and independence of the court is questionable at the very beginning
of the proceedings.
3. Cases where a charge is unpolitical or of a political nature but which
are a subterfuge to disguise or hide real political motives.
4. Finally, cases which combine "hooked-up charges with a simultaneous
implosion of judiciousness in the legal proceeding." Id. at xiii-xvi.
See also L. Friedman, Political Power and Legal Legitimacy: A Short History of
Political, Trials, 30 Ai,xrocss REv. 157 (1970)., where political trials are considered
to be of three types: "cases which are politicly motivated, those that are politically
determined, and those which have substantial political consequences." Id. at 158.
12 See C. Darrow, Address to the Prisoners in the Cook County Jail in
ArromEYx FOR THE D~sAmNm 13-15 (A. Weinberg ed. 1957). Where Clarence
Darrow urged a view of legal prosecutions which was based on a view of social
class and inequality in distribution of wealth:
Most all of the crimes for which we are punished are property crimes.
There are a few personal crimes, like murder-but they are very few.
The crimes committed are mostly those against property. If this punish-
ment is right the criminals must have a lot of property. How much money
is there in this crowd? And yet you are all here for crimes against
property. The people up and down the Lake Shore have not committed
crime; stiU they have so much property they don't know what to do with
it. It is perfectly plain why these people have not committed crimes
against property; they make the laws and therefore do not need to break
them. And in order for you to get some property you are obliged to
break the rules of the game....
The only way in the world to abolish crime and criminals is to abolish
the big ones and the little ones together. Make fair conditions of life.
Give men a chance to live. Abolish the right of private ownership of land,
abolish monopoly, make the world partners in production, partners in the
good things of life. Nobody would steal if he could get something of his
own some easier way....
See also W.E.B. DuBois, THE AuT onoAonr- OF W.E.B. DuBois 390 (1968).
While it can be argued that such a cosmic view of the political trial, which would
make all crimes political crimes because of social inequality, is justified; such a
view necessitates a total social revolution. Even if such a revolution is to occur in
the long run, political activists find themselves subject to prosecution and a
narrower view of the political trial permits the civil libertarian to struggle for an
open society where political dissent is possible. Of course, it may be true that
political prosecutions are repressive acts which radicalize the populous and hasten
the coming of "the revolution." There is, however, a certain element of faith
required for the basic premise that the general citizenry in fact can be "radicalized."
1972]
narrower definition of political trials is more functional where one
is seeking to isolate certain procedural and substantive aspects
of judicial proceedings in efforts to criticize, reform and limit the
oppressive effect of certain trials which have political ramifica-
tions and are viewed as political by the defendants.
Generally, criminal prosecutions are brought in order to deter,
isolate, punish or rehabilitate individuals who threaten the health,
safety, and welfare of other citizens and the social community.
Crimes against persons and crimes against property provide
general characterizations of those acts which serve as the occasion
for trials of a nonpolitical character. The decision to prosecute
and to sentence is made on an assessment of the impact of the
criminal justice system on the defendant and his future conduct
as well as the overall efficiency of the criminal justice system
itself.'3 On the other hand, the purpose of the political trial is to
discredit and obstruct those who pose a threat to the integrity
of the state and to those who hold political power.14 The state as
18 The function and objectives of the "criminal justice system" were described
in the final report of the Presidents Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice:
Any criminal justice system is an apparatus society uses to enforce the
standards of conduct necessary to protect individuals and the community.
It operates by apprehending, prosecuting convicting, and sentencing
those members of the community who violate the basic rules of group
existence. The action taken against lawbreakers is designed to serve
three purposes beyond the immediately punitive one. It removes dan-
gerous people from the community; it deters others from criminal be-
havior; and-it gives society an opportunity to attempt to transform law-
breakers into law-abiding citizens.
U.S. PREsmENTs CoMMIssION, REPORT ON LAw ENFOnCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TON OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocmEy, at 7 (1967). It
may be said that some crimes against persons lack a victim and hence are directed
at preserving a moral order [see e.g., DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS
(1965)] and that crimes against property have as their objective the preservation
of an economic order [see e.g., DAlmow, CRnIm ITS CAUSE AND TRnTUMNT
(1922)]. Such an analysis which may in fact be well founded operates to convert
many offenses currently prosecuted into political crimes.
' 4 See K. Salter, Book Review, 58 CAL. LAw REv. 781 (1970), where in
reviewing JEssICA MrrFoPD's THE TRIAL OF DR. SpocE AND M~Au LEVIN et. al.
(ed.) THE TALES OF HOFFMAN, it is observed:
The government is confronted with a serious ideological and political
threat posed by the opposition of increasingly large and disparate groups.
... The governments resort to the trial forum is a conscious and calcu-
lated choice among various alternatives. It is also an expedient and
effective method of discrediting opposition groups and arousing public
sentiment against them....
The second function of the political trial [is] deterrence. . . . The
object is to prevent this larger group from participating in demonstra-
tions, from signing petitions, or from appearing on television lest they
meet the same fate as the five defendants. Id. at 783. [emphasis added].
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it is constituted acts to isolate particular individuals and to make
examples of them in order to warn others not to oppose existing
power. Under these circumstances harassment, isolation and
exemplification seem to be the ends of the political trial.15
In determining whether a trial is political or not, the most
difficult case for analysis is a prosecution in which political and
criminal elements are intermixed; such a case occurs where a
"demonstration" or "riot" involves both dissent and destruction
of property or injury to persons. Here it may be difficult to
separate the elements, but one may use the general approach here
proposed by asking two questions: (1) Would a prosecution have
been brought given different circumstances or objectives? (2)
Does the designation "demonstration" versus "riot" hinge on the
actor's objectives? For example, given destruction of property
and physical injury, would a fraternity "panty raid" be treated
the same as a "protest rally?" If not, a prosecution may be deemed
political. A second approach requires that one look at the specific
charge. Again given destruction of property or physical injury,
should the charges be "malicious destruction of property" or "bat-
tery" or "trespassing?" Or are the charges "rioting" or con-
spiracy to riot" or "traveling interstate with intent to riot?" In
15 Jessica Mitford in a concluding "postscript" to her account of the trial of Dr.
Spock and his fellow defendants for conspiracy to counsel, aid and abet violations
SF
ofthe Selective Service Act [see generally United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165
(1969)], offers a sweeping condemnation of political trials as devices to silence
political opposition:
A look at some of the more celebrated political trials of this century
lends support to this view. Eugene Debs, Harry Bridges, Tom Mooney,
the Roseribergs and Sobell, and Alger Hiss all enjoyed every benefit but
one of what we call due process of law. Their procedural rights were
protected every step of the way: trial by jury, able, often distinguished
counsel of their choice, interminable appeals all the way up to the
Supreme Court-they were given every conceivable consideration, per-
mitted to avail themselves of every legal remedy known to Anglo-
American jurisprudence. In case after case, conviction after conviction,
press and public never failed to point out with pride: "See what a
marvelously fair trial we gave those scoundrels, those traitors]"
The one right they were denied was, of course, the most basic of all:
the right not to be tried for dissent. For no matter how the formal
accusation was styled ("perjury" in the case of Alger Hiss, "conspiracy
to commit espionage" in the case of the Rosenbergs) behind these
prosecutions lay the decision of government to move against what it
aeemed to be threatening and discordant voice of opposition to the
established order.
I. MrrFonD, Tim TRiAL OF DR. SPocK 239 (1969). But see H. Packer, The Con-
spiracy Weapon in TRYAus oF RE isTANCE 170 (1970). While Packer faults Miss
Mitford for not distinguishing dissent cases such as Spock's from espionage cases
such as Hiss, he concedes that there is no denial of the basic proposition that
political trials are aimed at silencing and rendering impotent opposition.
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other words, are the charges for typical criminal activity special
crimes where the injuries or damages spring from politically
motivated behavior and are the penalties for typically criminal
behavior more severe where the motives of the defendant's are
political? Where special crimes are charged or special penalties
sought, there is a political prosecution.16
An illustration of how a political purpose can motivate official
action is found in a poignant passage from Jean Anouilh's drama
Antigone: Creon, refusing to bury the body of the dead brother of
Antigone, argues that political power is the issue:
Creon: ... God knows, I have things enough to do today with-
out wasting my time on an insect like you. There's plenty to
do, I assure you when you've just put down a revolution....
For it is a fact that this whole business is politics: the mournful
shade of Polynices, the decomposing corpse, the sentimental
weeping, and the hysteria that you mistake for heroism-noth-
ing but politics.
Look here. I may not be soft, but I'm fastidious. I like
things clean, shipshape, well scrubbed. Don't think that I am
not just as offended as you are by the thought of that meat
rotting in the sun. In the evening, when the breeze comes in
off the sea, you can smell it in the palace, and it nauseates me.
But I refuse even to shut my window. It's vile; and I can tell
you what I wouldn't tell anybody else: it's stupid, monstrously
16 The objective here is to show that a choice of alternative charges for a
particular act may reveal a prosecutorial intent to label an offense political rather
than criminal. Such a choice may reflect a desire to obtain a more serious penalty
for the offense in order to maximize the political benefits from the prosecution.
Kirchheimer described the particular difficulty with prosecutions where a criminal
charge and a political motive are intertwined:
[Political issues may well pervade trials involving common crimes, that
is, offenses which may have been committed by any member of the com-
munity for any one of a multitude of possible motives. Political coloring
would be imparted to such a garden-variety criminal trial by the motives
or objectives of the prosecution, or by the nolitical background, affiliation,
or standing of the defendant. Depending on political climate, judicial
tradition, and general mores, the trial may specifically serve egotistic
purposes of the groups in power by eliciting or publically recording in-
formation that sheds unfavorable light on political opponents. While
giving maximnum publicity outside the courtroom to whatever evidencedamaging to the political foe should appear at the trial, governmental
authorities or influential political groups will also have the chance toadvertise strict adherence to the standards of law equally impartial to all,
and to play down the political element within the framework of highly
regular proceedings deserving of universal recognition.
Kmcmsrn, supra note 1, at 52. See also S. K-islov, The Hoffa Case: The Crfmi-
nal Trial as a Process of Interest Group Leadership Selection in PorricAL TRIALs
204 (T. Becker ed. 1971).
19721]
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stupid. But the people of Thebes have got to have their noses
rubbed into it a little longer. My Godl If it was up to me, I
should have had them bury your brother long ago as a matter
of public hygiene. I admit that what I am doing is childish.
But if the featherheaded rabble I govern are to understand
what's what, that stench has to fill the town for a month 17
It is this symbolic matter of the prosecution which sets the political
trial aside from other judicial proceedings. It is not a mere act or
man who is tried but an idea, a movement, a political faction.
The crime may be a political crime like treason, or it may be a
routine criminal prosecution with a political purpose. The de-
fendant will be symbolic and the trial will have ritual significance
both to the state and to its opponents. The defendant is more
than a personal threat to the state; he represents his faction or the
ideology with which he identifies. The trial serves to purify the
society of the dissident group and the threat of subversion it
presents. Most often, the political trial is not conducted by the
prosecutor and tried by a judge in any usual sense; rather, the
state through a team effort of prosecutor and judge vindicate the
interest of the status quo."' The political trial in this context
17 Antigone in Five Plays 34-35 J. Anouilh transl. (1958). Howard Zinn, Pro-
fessor of Government at Boston University, makes the point that failure to see
the various functions of law leads one to see law as a "monolith" and to miss the
essentially political objectives of some laws:
Seeing the legal system as a monolith disguises the fact that laws
aimed at radicals, while pretending to protect the society at large, really
try to preserve the existing political and economic arrangements. The
Espionage Act of 1917 (even its title deceives us into thinking its aim
is protecting the community) sought to prevent people from communi-
cating certain ideas to soldiers or would-be soldiers which might discour-
age their carrying on a war. The Act begs the question of whether carry-
ing on the war is a blessing to the society at large or a danger to it.
The Smith Act provision against teaching the violent overthrow of
the government assumes the government is not evil enough to deserve
being overthrown. The Selective Service Act assumes the draft protects
us all when indeed it may take our sons to die for someone else's priv-
ileges. This is a small class of laws, but its psychological impact on the
right of protest ("Watch your step, or else . . .") can hardly be over-
estimated. It stands ready for use any time dissidence threatens to become
too widespread. The recent Chicago "conspiracy" trial is an example.
H. Zinn, The Conspiracy of Law in Tim RuLE OF LAw 27 (R. P. Wolff ed. 1971).
Is While the prosecutor may alone initiate and prosecute his case as a
"political trial" without any assistance from the 'ud e, it appears that where the
defendant is viewed as a political threat to established authority, the judge and
prosecutor act together to protect the established political authority. See K.
Dolbeare and J. Grossman LeRoi Jones in Newark: A Political Trial in T. BEcEi,
POLrCAL TmS 227-247 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Dolbeare and Gross-
man]. Dolbeare and Grossman are critical of Judge Kapp, the Newark, New
Continued on next page)
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occasions oppression, repression and censorship. The parties in
the courtroom are mere puppets of the state whose performance
warns dissidents or satisfies the populous. 9 To the defendants
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Jersey trial udge who presided over the trial of LeRoi Jones for illegal possession
of firearms following the Newark Riot:
To be sure, Jones himself was extremely provocative and, in the
words of the sympathetic New York Times correspondent, Walter Wag-
goner, guilty of "unconscionable behavior" during the trial. But it seemed
to many witnesses that Judge Kapp was holding Jones personally respon-
sible for the riots and indeed for everything that was wrong with race
relations in Newark.
If this had been just another trial, perhaps the judge would not
have accompanied the case to another county. He might have let the
prosecutor make his normal incidence of mistakes. He might have
charged the jury on the state of the law and not on the state of the city
or the veracity and patriotism of the police. .. Id. at 285-36.
It is hard to believe that LeRoi Jones was treated exactly like any
other defendant charged with the same offense. Even allowing for the
highly charged atmosphere and the tensions resulting from the multitude
of riot trials, Jones was singled out for particular attention for allegedly
committing a minor offense. There was determination to convict in every
recorded action of Judge Kapp, and his interpretations of evidence, charge
to the jury, and sentencing speech were beyond recognition as fair and
impartial judging-notwithstanding the fact that they may have been
legally permissible.
The important question is the determination of why Judge Kapp
chose to play the role of judge and prosecutor. Did he perceive that this
was expected of him as a vindication of the established white com-
munity and a mark of its refusal to accept any responsibility for the
riots? Did he consider LeRoi Jones a threat to the peace and tran-
quility of the community and himself as the last bastion of defense? Did
he think that making an example of LeRoi Jones would deter future
rioters? Id. at 238 [emphasis added].
See also J. MrrFoRn, THE Tms OF DR. SpocK 123 (1969), where Miss Mitford
describes Judge Ford's intervention into the Spock Trial:
The judge is fond and fatherly toward the jury, he leans over them
beaming, and sometimes we can tell from the clatter of masculine
ha-ha-ha's that he has made a joke or two as he greets them in the
morning. His manner toward Mr. Wall [the prosecutor] is hard to
determine; we don't think he actually likes Mr. Wall, rather he seems to
steer him as elder to novice. Often, he does not wait for Mr. Wall to
object to a defense question, he anticipates him. "Strike it outl Go
forward!" His voice, deeper than graveltoned, has the timbre of a truck
shifting gears on a hill.
19 Dolbeare and Grossman, supra note 18, at 239. After examining the trial
of LeRoi Jones, the authors conclude:
That LeRoi Jones was the defendant was probably an accident only
in the sense that he happened to be arrested at the height of the con-
flagration. It apparently was no accident that the Newark authorities,
realizing the value of the prisoner in their custody, sought to maximize
the educational value of such an event.
Whether or not Judge Kapp was a formal and planned participant in
the production of the spectacle, or whether he simply played the role he
did for personal, perhaps subconscious, reasons, is largely unimportant
Being a man of conservative values, Judge Kapp obviously looked upon
the defendant with contempt, as a threat to organized society, as a
purveyor of what Judge Kapp thought was obscene literature and as a
provocateur.
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and their followers, the political prosecution is a vindication of
their belief that they are the objects of calculated persecution.
The political trial may produce a conviction but it has also pro-
duced a political martyr.
In the political trial the prosecution and court are merged
into one as an attack on the state is an attack on the court.20 The
defendant in turn views the court as an instrument of state
oppression and focuses on it his hostility toward the state.-" All
20 See Dolbeare and Grossman, supra note 18, at 240, where the authors
observe the merging of prosecutor and judge in the trial of Le Roi Jones:
In summary of these observations it can be said that both judge and
prosecutor operated in the margins of the roles that they could normally
have been expected to play, that their behavior was characterized by
what seemed to be a single-minded determination to convict and severely
punish LeRoi Jones, and this single-mindedness could not be explained
with reference to the nature of the offense charged in open Court, but
rather only with reference to the defendant's role as a severe critic of
white society.
A related observation made by many commentators is that judges may attempt
to limit the scope of argument in order to minimize the use of the court as a
platform for social criticism. This maximizes the repressive advantages of the
political trial to the state and minimizes the opportunity for the defendants to
derive "propaganda" benefits. See H. Zinn, The Conspiracy of Law in THE RUr.E
OF LAW at 35 (R. Wolff ed. 1971):
Not so mythical are the actual cases of political protestors hauled
into court on ordinary criminal charges and prevented by the judge from
airing the political grounds of their actions. (Theodore Mommsen put it
well: "Impartiality in political trials is about on the level with Immaculate
Conception: one may wish for it, but one cannot produce it." Quoted in
Orro Kacm nmRa, POLrricAL JusncE). It should make us all pause to
know that within the space of a few months similar pronouncements were
made in a court in Moscow and a Court in Milwaukee. The Moscow
judge refused to let a group arrested for distributing leaflets in Red
Square against the Russian invasion of Czechoslavakia discuss anything
political; the only issue, he said, was: "Did they or did they not break
the law in question?"
The Milwaukee judge similarly refused to let the priests who had
burned draft records explain their motivation. The only question, he said,
was: "Did the defendants commit arson, burglary and theft?" When one
witness began to discuss the idea of civil disobedience, the judge inter-
rupted him with what must be a classic judicial statement: "You can't
discuss that. That's getting to the heart of the matter."
See generally J. Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters
52 YALE REv. 481 (1968).
21 See e.g., L. Weiner, The Political Trial of a People's Insurrection, in THE
CONSPIRACY 195 (P. Abel, et al. ed. 1969). Lee Weiner, a defendant in the
"Chicago conspiracy" case and a doctoral candidate in sociology at Northwestern
University, is clear in his belief that the courts as they are instrumental in the
political trial act as repressive institutions:
In political trials, court action may be initiated to influence the
distribution of political power or to affirm the public order or, more
drastic a move, to upset or destroy individuals or movements which
threaten the state. Yet the decision to enlist the court in behalf of the
political goals of men in power may not be a matter of necessity, but
rather one of choice or mere convenience. Id. at 196.
(Continued on next page)
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of this is aptly illustrated by U.S. v. Marshal, 22 the Seattle con-
spiracy trial where the subject of the alleged conspiracy was an
"attack on the federal courthouse" with the throwing of paint and
rocks following the sentencing in the Chicago Seven Conspiracy
trial of the demonstration leaders at the National Democratic
Convention.23  The court which was to try the Seattle demon-
strators was the very court which had been the symbolic focus
of their protest. The court viewed the defendants as a threat to
the democratic system while the defendants in turn viewed the
court as an agent of repression. 4
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Choosing to use the courts for political ends is also something of a
convenience for a regime. It allows it to engage in a sanctified style of
political warfare which sets restraints on its enemies and yet confirms
the state's method of repression. The aura of legitimacy and fairness
that is retained by even e most corrupt court can be used by the gov-
ernment to attack the character of political opponents, hamper their
activities, and assert the correctness of the state's official interpretation
of events. Id. at 197.
As with the defendants in any political trial, we too recognize that
the battle in the courtroom is not just about some specific activity of
certain men or women. To appeal exclusively to our civil libertarian
rights in the courtroom, or to simply deny our actions had wrongful
consequences, would be to accept the political myths and definitions
under which the old and sterile men now rule. Instead we must move
as best we can to clarify a new political reality. Id. at 199. [emphasis
added].
A more extreme statement based on a Marxist ideological view of law and
political institutions is offered by Angela Davis and Bettina Aptheker in A. DAvis,
et. al., IF THEY CovmE N THE MORNING 13 (1971):
A central conclusion we have reached in preparing this book, in fact,
is that the entire apparatus of the bourgeois democratic state, especially
its judicial system and prisons, is disintegrating. The judicial and prison
systems are to be increasingly defined as instruments for unbridled
repression, institutions which may be successfully resisted but which are
more and more impervious to meaningful reform. Rather they must be
transformed in the revolutionary sense.
22 United States v. Marshall, No. 51942 (W. D. Wash., filed April 16, 1970).
23 Count I of the indictment in United States v. Marshall, supra note 22,
charged that the defendants conspired:
To wilfully and unlawfully injure, and aid, abet, counsel and
procure others to wilfully and unlawfully injure the property of the
United States, that is, the United States Court House, Fifth Avenue
and Spring Street, Seattle, Washington, and the Federal Office Building,
First Avenue and Madison Street, Seattle, Washington, thereby causing
damage in excess of $100.00, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1361 and 18
U.S.C. 2.
Counts H-VI charge defendants with traveling in interstate commerce "with intent
to incite, organize, promote and encourage a riot" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2101.
See generally L. Weiner, The Seattle Eight: What, Another Conspiracy?, TnE NA-
TION 424 (N4ovember 2, 1970).
24 See Weiner, supra note 23.
(Continued on next page)
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In this setting, contempt of court becomes an inevitable con-
sequence of the political trial as well as an instrumental device in
its conduct.25 The judge as the symbol of the state becomes the
focus of the defendant's frustration and hostility and this antipathy
is likely to take the form of scornful conduct. The judge as pos-
sessor of political power and an officer of the state views the
defendant's attack on the state with alarm and he will be most
sensitive to abuse by the defendants. The prosecution, no matter
on what theory the case was initiated, must view the great
potential for contemptuous conduct as an alternative basis for
disposition of the case.
Arthur Niederhoffer and Alexander Smith of the John Jay
College of Criminal Justice have provided an excellent analysis
of the proud and the profane as they interact in the context of the
political trial.2" Here the judge is portrayed as considering himself
and being considered as symbolic of the state.' t A great tempta-
tion for the judge is succumbing to a pride derived from a sense
of power and responsibility. The authors conclude that this
temptation: "is stronger in a more serious or a more controversial
case than a minor trial. When the charge is a serious crime the
judge often drops the facade of objectivity and patience."28
While the judge is viewed as inflated by a sense of power, the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
The warning which the government hopes liberals, radicals and
would-be dissidents will read in both their federal charges is: don't get
involved; don't participate, don't stick your neck out protesting social
injustices or wars, because you never know when you'll be picked up and
accused of deeds that could land you in prison for years....
t .. Not all New Leftists in the Pacific Northwest are enamored of
the Seattle Eight or the SLF [Seattle Liberation Front, a radical political
organization]; yet the government's repressive legal action automatically
raises them to positions of "spokesmen," "leaders," perhaps even
"martyrs." Id. at 426-27.25 See Lukas, supra note 2, at 106, Lukas reporting on the Chicago Conspiracy
trial for the New York Times offered the following evaluation of that proceeding
as a political trial:
[I]t was the government that chose to fight an essentially political
battle in court. Too often people ask whether the judge or the defen-
dants were to blame for politicizing the trial. Undoubtedly both must
bear substantial blame for other things. But the justice Department and
its allies in Chicago must bear this onus. Once that politica prosecution
was launched, it was probably inevitable that it should be met by an
aggressive political defense and presided over by an openly political
judge. Id. at 106.2 6 A. Niederhoffer and A. Smith, Power and Personality in the Courtroom, 3
CoNN. L. Ttrv. 233 (1971).
27 Id. at 237-238.
28Id. at 240.
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defendants, feeling weak and alienated, compensate by adopting
a stance characterized by gall, brazeness and effrontery-a com-
pensation for lack of power.29 The alienated political defendant
views himself as a symbol of the oppressed, and he directs his
wrath at the judge who symbolizes the oppressor. While the
defendant's wrath does not exceed the profane, it is directed at
idiosyncrasies of the judge and attempts to exceed the limits of
his tolerance. Conflict with the court is inevitable and always to
the defendant's detriment. For the judge, rules of procedure and
the contempt power, conclude Niederhoffer and Smith, are "cam-
ouflage to cover his conduct [so that it will appear] that his
motivation is not neurotic aggression, but is an expression of his
commitment to protect the system."30
Tom Hayden, a defendant in the case of the Chicago demon-
stration leaders, 31 has portrayed the defendant's attitude toward
the court in the political prosecution:
The court in American society is something like a church.
There is a widespread conspiracy to hold the court holy, above
the world of sin and deals and power. It is to be treated with a
special respect; quiet is to be observed by those who enter,
and speech is only to follow formal procedure. The judge is a
high priest possessed of a wisdom that mere citizens do not
have. He wears robes, makes interpretations of obscure scrip-
tures, and holds a gavel (like the cross) representing authority.
He is referred to as "Your Honor" or "If the Court please ... ,"
much as the Pope is "His Holiness." Perhaps more than any
other public institution in America, the court system demands
an absolute conformity to its rules and its atmosphere. If citi-
zens will only respect this institution, then all their conflicts
can be sifted, negotiated, and resolved.3
2
The political defendants' rejection of the court and judge follow
almost inevitably from this perspective of the court as a vestigial
institution perpetuated by and perpetuating the power of the
20 Id. at 239.
30 Id. at 241.
31 United States v. Dellinger [No. 69 Crim. 180 S.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 1969] is
the case of the leaders of the demonstrations in Chicago following the 1968
Democratic Convention. The defendants were charged with violation of the
section of the 1968 Civil Rights Act which prohibits travel in interstate commerce
with intent to incite, organize, promote, encourage, participate in or carry on a
riot, and with conspiracy to incite a riot. See 18 U.S.C. § 2101.32 T. HAYDEN, TmAL 97 (1970).
1972.]
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state. Hayden concludes that the ritualized court can be de-
meaned and its power challenged in the interest of political
independence; this means an "attack on the courts."33 The "attack
on the courts" inevitably means citation for contempt.3 4 Yet,
even where the defendants have not so specifically formulated
an ideological position, an attack or outburst is almost inevitable.
The hostility of the political defendant must be expected. 5 This
33 Id. at 97. The characterization of the courts as political instruments, leads
to a rejection of their authority and thus to denunciation; Hayden illustrates this
position by his plea for de-ritualization of the courts:
At the same time, everyone knows that this concept of the court is a
myth. The court is political; the judges are elected or (in most cases)
appointed by politicians. Behind those robes are men of political motiva-
tion: landlords, underworld figures, partisan manipulators. Nearly all of
them are white, middle class, middle aged, conservative males. The laws
they administer favor rich against poor, white against black, respectable
against non-conformist.
When the courts are turned into a weapon against change, trials must
be turned into an attack on the courts. Treating a trial politically means
dealing with the courtroom the way it is, not the way it is ritualized.
See generally W. Schneir, Desanctifying the Courts in RTAMcAL LAwYaS 297
(J. Black ed. 1971) where the tactic of renunciation and demeaning of the court
is exhorted:
By law, a trial is a public event witnessed by spectators and, by a far
wider audience, through the press. Defendants in a political trial would
be remiss if they did not use such a forum to explicate their political
ideas, life styles, values, aspirations, ideas....
Nevertheless, why all the high jinks, the refusals to stand up, sit down,
take oaths, the use of four letter words, wearing judicial robes to court,
bringing in birthday cakes, protests over bathroom facilities, the inter-
ruptions of the judge, calling him a liar, references to his wife's war
industry stock holdings, laughing openly at his biased rulings and so on?
Wasn't this so much kamikaze tactics, resulting in unnecessary jail terms
for contempt and antagonizing some of the Times' law professors?
In response, I would submit that it was precisely these and innumerable
other bits of theatre that were in fact the most politically significant
aspect of the trial-though for some the politics probably was communi-
cated on a subliminal level. For what occurred in Chicago was nothing
less than the beginning of the desanctification of that holy of holies of
American institutions: the federal courts.
To apply a simple definition, desanctification means to deprive a leader
or institution of one of the most useful attributes for the exercise of
power-the aura of being free from sin, purified, set apart from the
ordinary, consecrated, dedicated, inviolable. It is worth noting that the
related word, sanction, embodies concepts involving authority, law, and
sacredness ....Desanctification of the courts is a process essential to the building of a
mass radical consciousness in America.
34 While the United States Supreme Court has held that concern for the
dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment as criminal
contempt of mere criticism of a judge or his decisions, but has held that such
punishment can be justified by the application of a "clear and present danger"
test of the obstruction of justice. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941),
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), and Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962).
35 Ramsey Clark has attempted to explain the courtroom conflict in the case
(Continued on next page)
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is compounded however by the frustration of the political activist
who usually is compelled by court procedure to speak through
an attorney who, no matter how competent, can never express
fully the passion and outrage of the activist defendant. 6 The
hostility and frustration of the political defendant who is wary
of both attorneys and judges is aptly illustrated by repeated
pleas by Bobby Seale, another Chicago conspiracy defendant,
who repeatedly demanded the right to address the court and to
examine witnesses:
Mr. Seale: If you let me defend myself, you could instruct
me on the proceedings that I can act, but I have
to just-
The Court: You will have to be quiet.
Mr. Seale: All I have to do is clear the record. I want to de-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
of the Chicago conspirators in terms of their preconceptions and consequent be-
havior:
Realize the principals came to court with their prejudices. Con-
sider the impact of these on the trial. Suppose the defendants believed
the trial was purely political-that there was neither the purpose nor the
capability of sifting facts to find truth and applying clear and uniform
ruies of law to those facts. Suppose the Judge, trained in law, religiously
committed to respect for the system of law and te court as its highest
priest, believed there was a deliberate, preconceived, continuing, and con-
tumacious effort to humiliate by revolutionary forces? Might much of
what happened flow from such attitudes? Add the sudden emotionaliza-
tion from courtroom conduct appearing to confirm such prejudice and
you may glimpse why what happened happened.
R. Clark Preface to CorrmTTir: TAANscnu'T OF THE CONTE MT CrrAnONS, SEN-
TENcES, AND RFsPONSES OF THE CHICAGO CONsPIRACY 10 at v (1970). [hereinafter
referred to as CHMCAGO CONTEMPT T scaPT.]
a6 See generally M. Burnham, Ruchell and Angela Want to Represent Them-
selves, in A. DAVIs, IF THEY Comm IN TnE MoRNING 222 (1971):
Both Angela Davis and Ruchell Magee are demanding the right to
represent themselves.... The reasons why Black defendants are increas-
ingly turning to self-representation spring from the nature of an in-
herently racist, repressive, and class-biased judicial system. Many poor
Black defendants feel compelled to represent themselves because they
know that no lawyer is available to them who will present their legal case
with aggressiveness and sensitivity. At the same time, other Blacks,
charged wvith crime for overtly political reasons are also turning to self-
defense in their constant search to find new forms of forcefully and effec-
tively defending themselves and their movement.
Nor is the desire to self-representation in court limited to Black defendants, for in-
stance radicals in the Seattle conspiracy chose to represent themselves and did a
credible job. Id. at 231. See also Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented, Mis-
represented and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 DuQuEsNE L. REv. 245
(1964).
For authority which suggest that there may be limits on the right to waive
counsel, See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948), holding in fact that there
is a "strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel;"
and Singer v. UnitedStates, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), holding that a defendant has no
absolute right to waive a jury trial.
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fend myself in behalf of my constitutional rights.
The Court: Let the record show that the defendant Seale
has refused to be quiet in the face of the ad-
monition and direction of the court.
Mr. Seale: Let the record show that Bobby Seale speaks out
in behalf of his constitutional rights, his right to
defend himself, his right to speak in behalf of
himself in this courtroom.
The Court: Again let the record show that he has disobeyed
the order of the Court.37
The exchange gave rise to contempt specification "number seven"
with a three month sentence for Bobby Seale. a8
The inevitability of the outburst or attack provides the pros-
ecution with an alternative basis for convicting the defendants.
It is not without significance that both the Chicago" and Seattle °
conspiracy trials concluded with contempt sentencing. Moreover,
it should be noted that such judicial proceedings as the federal
grand jury interrogation of Leslie Bacon,41 allegedly knowledge-
able about the bombing of the United States Capitol building,
concluded after several days of questioning with a contempt
citation. The political defendant's conviction that the courts are
agents of repression, the hostility and frustration with authority
which characterize his personality, and the very life style of the
contemporary political defendant dictate the outcome of any
judicial proceeding: contempt of court.42 And prosecutors have
37 Supra note 31, Trial Transcript at 3642, reprinted in CHccAGo TRANscvr,
supra note 27, at 11.8S Id.
39Id See J. Clavir and J. Spitzer, Contempt Proceedings in Tnx CONSPIACY
TRIAL.579 (1970). See generally CHCAGO CONTEMTTHnANscIPT, supra note 27.4 0 United States v. Marshall No. 51942 (W.D. Wash., filed April 16, 1970),
contempt order entered in case by United States District Judge George Boldt on
December 14, 1970.41 See N. Y. Times, May 19, 1971 at 21, col. 5. Leslie Bacon was held in
custody and required to give information with regard to the March 1, 1971,
bombing of the United States Capitol building to a Federal grand jury in Seattle
on the basis that she was granted "limited immunity" from prosecution. After
answering questions for a number of days, Miss Bacon refused to give further
testimony and was held in contempt of court. See N. Y. Times, June 8, 1971 at 15,
col. 7. Miss Bacon was subjected to a second indictment growing out of the grand
jr proceedings on March 24, 1972 when she was charged with perjury for her
denial that she had been on the capital grounds the day before the bombing, see
N.Y. Times, March 30, 1972 at 16, col. 4. Both "contempt" and "perjury" can
be regarded as legal theories underlying the "derivative political trial,' see note 43
infra.
42 See RADicAL LAw-Emss 11 (J. Black ed. 1971), where the contemporary
(Continued on next page)
[Vol. 60
not missed this point. A prosecution theory like conspiracy or
inciting to riot is fraught with difficulties; there are problems of
proof as well as problems with recognized constitutional protec-
tions such as free speech and freedom of association. If the
indictment theory fails, there is a good possibility of sentencing
for contempt.43 Otto Kirchheimer has suggested that the use of
"contempt," provides a legal basis upon which a much broader
scoped political trial can be maintained:
When courts are called upon more and more frequently to
curb or suppress political conduct deemed harmful to the pub-
lic order, artificial legal devices acquire special importance.
Reprehensible political action is no longer limited to the two
traditional types, the criminal offense as a political tool and
the political offense proper. More and more, the courts have
to deal with offense artifacts. No law can impose sanctions
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
political activist's distrust in the courts and his sense of futility as he faces any trial
is viewed as necessarily resulting in contemptuous conduct before a court in which
he is a defendant:
Among radicals and revolutionaries, there is mounting contempt for
the courts and the legal system. The courts, they say, are the courts of the
capitalist system. They uphold the law-written and unwritten-of that
system. It is futile to hope that a racist society will produce non-racist
courts. It is a wishful fantasy to believe that a society that daily, and quite
methodically, victimizes its poor will treat them charitably, let alone justly,
in its courts. It is a fantasy to place faith in the bright beacon of the
Supreme Court, or to invest in the hope that a single judge with "in-
tegrity" can check the ineluctable flow of the system.
See also Weiner, supra note 21 at 199, who clearly reflects the fact that the
political activist's attitude toward the court derives from his underlying attitude
toward authority in general; Weiner argues: "What we must fight to achieve in
the court and in the streets is the evocation and maintenance of a vision and a
reality which legitimizes a new form of struggle that links, and finally integrates
an alternative cultural life-style with the systematic restructuring of political and
social institutions in America.
43 See Kirchheimer, supra note 1, at 44-46, who viewed "contempt" as an
available legal device in political prosecutions: "The derivative political trial,
where the weapons of defamation, perjury, and contempt are manipulated in
an effort to bring disrepute upon a political foe" Id. at 46. Kirchheimer con-
curred in the view that difficlties with prosecutions for such crimes as treason
and conspiracy compel resort to the use of contempt prosecutions; citing as
authority a series of cases including Watkins v. U. S., 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Braden v. U.S. 865 U.S. 431
(1961); and Wilkinson v. U.S., 365 U.S. 399 (1961), Kirchheimer concluded:
[A]pplication of treason and espionage provisions, especially after
settlement of the batch of World War II incidents-among them cases of
United States' born propagandists stationed in enemy territory-has been
rare. In addition there is the constitutional twilight zone of sedition
legislation of the fast decades; here are the inquisitorial machines for the
production of contempt citations against uncooperative political deviants.
Application has depended on the trade winds of domestic political com-
petition and ressures and on the corresponding see-saw battles in the
higher federal courts. Id. at 4445. [emphasis added].
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upon all types of action which in some future situation may be
taken to be criminally harmful. Often enough, the specific act
which to the government seems the reprehensible expression
of a prejudicial political attitude or action pattern is not
punishable under the law, or is technically so elusive that it
defies prosecution. Instead of the act itself, then, a substitute
act is brought before the bar, viz. the verbalization-pinned
down as perjured or defamatory [or contemptuous]-of a sus-
pect pattern of attitude which may or may not have crystal-
lized in a pertinent criminal offense. Action in perjury or
defamation [or contempt] brings forth this prototype of the
modem political trial. There is also a geographically limited
subspecies: through the agency of contempt proceedings the
political foe in America today is penalized for nonverbaliza-
tion.44
It is the inevitability of contemptuous conduct in the con-
temporary political trial which requires that the notion of "con-
tempt of court" be examined to determine if from a judicial point
of view it can be defined and limited so as to preserve the prob-
ability of an orderly trial without unduly providing the possibility
of judicial oppression. Such a restriction on the notion and use
of "contempt of court" may prove to be a device for breaking out
of the vicious circle that would make the courts an instrument of
political repression.
II. CONTEMPT OF COURT
In the introduction to a new edition of a standard work on
contempt of court, Ronald Goldfarb observes:
[O]ne new and perhaps to be the hottest contemporary
issue of the 1970's, involves the politicalization of the trial
process and the challenge provided by contempt, which is as
much a means of martyrdom and publicity for the contemnor
44 Id. at 52-53. Kirchheimer writing in 1961 particularly had in mind the
post World War II subversive cases where individuals were brought before
legislative committees and the courts and ordered to testify; and where the
individual refused, he was found in contempt. Nevertheless, the analytic scheme
propounded by Kirchheimer is applicable to the contemporary political radical
whose attitude toward authority, including the court, ensures that his required




as a way for judges to punish those who excessively demon-
strate their feelings that "the system" is unfair or unjust.45
The force of the contempt has been variously regarded. One
contemporary commentator has labeled the contempt power:
"the lifeblood of the judiciary"; 46 while a state supreme court
almost a century ago characterized the contempt power as: "per-
haps [the] nearest akin to despotic power of any power existing
under our form of government."4 7 A definition of contempt which
is reflective of that used by most American jurisdictions is pro-
vided by the United States Code: "A court of the United States
shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its dis-
cretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as....
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice."4 8
Traditionally contempt of court has been viewed as either civil
or criminal and either direct or indirect.49 Civil contempt pro-
ceedings are remedial and intended to force compliance with a
court order that has been disobeyed; criminal contempt proceed-
ings are instituted primarily for the purpose of punishing conduct
which is disrespectful of the court and obstructive of the adminis-
tration of justice.50 The latter is the legal theory invoked at con-
45 R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTE=MPT POWER 15 (Anchor ed. 1971). For the com-
mon law development of "contempt" see Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Con-
tempt, 25 L.Q.R. 288, (1920); Fox, The Nature of Contempt of Court 37 L.Q.R.
191 (1921).
46 See Cohen, The Contempt Power-The Lifeblood of the Judiciary, 2
LOYOLA L.J. 69 (1971).47 State ex. rel. Ashbaugh v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 193, 194-5 (Wisc. 1897).
4818 U.S.C. Sec. 401(1), 62 Stat. 701 (1948). See Ex Parte Robinson, 86
U.S. 205 (19 Wall.) (1873). See also 3 WHARTON'S CwmwAL LAW AND PRO-
cEDuRE § 1277, Interference with the Courts 623 (1957): "The obstruction of the
administration of justice is an indictable offense under the common law and by
statute in many jurisdictions."
49 See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey 56 CONELL L. REv.
183, 186 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dobbs].
50 See Gomphers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911):
If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the
benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence
is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court. It is true that punish-
ment by imprisonment may be remedial, as well as punitive, and many
civil contempt proceedings have resulted not only in the imposition of a
fine, payable to the complainant, but also in committing the defendant
to prison. But imprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the
defendant has refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions
of an order which, either in form or substance was mandatory in its
character. Imprisonment in such cases is not inaicted as a punishment,
but is intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he
(Continued on next page)
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tempt proceedings in most political trials; the denomination of
contempt as criminal may have, as we shall see, significance in
terms of the procedural safeguards that must be satisfied.5' Direct
contempt involves conduct committed in the presence of the
court; and indirect contempt arises from conduct which, although
not occurring in or near the presence of the court, tends to
obstruct the administration of justice.52 Contempt in political
trials is generally of the direct type due to the general intent of
the defendant to communicate his disdain for the court to both
the judge and the public.513 In analyzing contemptuous conduct
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
had refused to do. ... On the other band, if the defendant does that
which he has been commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing
accomplished. Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been
done nor afford any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the
disobedience. If the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite
period, the defendant.., cannot shorten the term by promising not to
repeat the offense. Such imprisonment operates not as a remedy coercive
in its nature, but solely as punishment for te completed act of dis-
obedience.
53 See generally Comment, Invoking Summary Criminal Contempt Procedures
-Use or Abuse? United States v. Dellinger-The "Chicago Seven" Contempts, 69
Miccr. L. REv. 1549 (1971). Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
exemplifies the authority invoked for conduct condemned as contempt in the
political trial; Rule 42 Criminal Contempt provides in part:
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished sum-
marily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct con-
stituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual
presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts
and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except
as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on
notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allow-
ing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall
state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged
and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the
judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on applica-
tion of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the
court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of
arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in
which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to
bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves
disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from
presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's con-
sent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an
order fixing the punishment.52 An action for direct contempt is provided by Clark v. United States, 289
U.S. 1 (1932), involving concealment or misstatement by a juror upon a voir dire
examination; an action for indirect contempt is provided by Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925), in which conduct involving a denunciation of a judge
would have been regarded as contempt if it had taken place in open court was
held to be contempt even though the denunciation took the form of a letter sent
to the judge's chambers.53 See generally Disruption in Our Courts: Why? TeAmL 12 (January-February
1971).
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in the context of the contemporary political trial it may be best to
consider conduct from another perspective: that is obstruction
versus insult. There is a distinction between conduct which
interferes with the orderly administration of justice, and conduct
which affords an affront to the dignity of the court.'54 While ob-
structive conduct is often offensive conduct, it may be that certain
conduct is offensive while not obstructive and if the categories
are distinguishable, there may be reason for the court to differ-
entiate conduct for the purpose of deciding the appropriateness
of punishment.
The need to preserve courtroom order is essential to the ex-
istence of a forum in which disputes may be settled and in which
conflict between an individual and the state can be resolved.55 Con-
duct which directly interferes with or prevents the orderly conduct
of judicial proceedings strikes at the heart of the legal system.56
'54See Dobbs, supra note 49, at 189 and 192 where a distinction is drawn
between "obstruction and disruption" and "Insult"
Actual disruption of judicial proceedings by noisemaking, assaults,
or other physically disruptive acts is a relatively small problem in the
total contempt picture. Probably more common is the challenge presented
to the administration of justice through distortion or blocking of its
processes-obstruction rather than disruption. The distinguishing char-
acteristic of obstruction cases is that the contemptuous act tends to
subvert fairness or efficiency without the direct challenge of disruption.
In general, this may include such acts as bribery, interfering with
execution of process, and other subversive rather than confrontative
acts. Id. at 189.
A number of cases, however, seem to assume that the precincts of
the court are hallowed and perhaps that even the judge himself carries
an aura of privilege. id. at 192.
55 See AMmCaN COLLEGE OF Tmr.. LAWXERs, REPORT AND REcoMM MNMA-
TIONS oN DsaUPTiON OF THE JuDIcALr PRocEss 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
AMNEucAN COLLEGE OF TA.L LAwYmas REPORT]:
In administering justice, courts are required to perform two difficult
tasks: discovering where the truth lies between conflicting versions of the
facts, and applying to the facts so found the relevant legal principles.
These tasks are as demanding and delicate as a surgical operation, and
like such an operation, they cannot be performed in an atmosphere of
bedlam.
G5See Rex v. Almon (1795) (undelivered opinion of Sir John Wilmont,
subsequently Lord Chief Justice of King's Bench). J. WMoNT, NoTEs OF
Osp'ioNs AND JuDGMENTS 243 (1802) cited in Cohen, supra note 38, at 71:
The Power, which the Courts in Westminister Hall have of vindi-
cating their Authority is coeval with their Foundation and Institution-
it is a necessary Incident to every Court of Justice, whether of Record
or not, to fine and imprison for a Contempt to the Court, acted in the
face of it, 1 Vent. 1. And the issuing of Attachments by the Supreme
Court of Justice in Westminister Hall for Contempts out of Court,
stands upon the same immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric of
the Common Law; it is as much the 'Lex Terrae and within the excep-
tion of the Magna Charta, as the issuing of any other Legal Process
whatsoever....
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Constant noisemaking, throwing of objects, disrobing, running or
moving about the courtroom are disruptive activities which inter-
fere with the orderly administration of justice and which have
properly been the subjects of contempt citation.57 In the summer
of 1631 at the Salisbury assizes: "[a prisoner] threw a brickbat
at the said Judge, which narrowly missed; and for this an indict-
ment was immediately drawn by Noy against the prisoner, and
his right hand cut off and fixed to the gibbet, upon which he was
himself immediately hanged in the presence of the Court.""8
While the drastic penalty may now seem barbaric, it remains the
rule that conduct which interferes with the administration of
the courts or threatens their functioning will be punished. A
recent United States Supreme Court case involving disruptive
conduct at a trial, United States v. Allen, 9 involved a defendant
who continued to shout abusive language and throw material
about the courtroom. The Court rightfully concluded that such
conduct was intolerable and suggested that sentencing for con-
tempt might be one proper remedy for such interference with
the orderly administration of the law.00 Nevertheless, it is easy
to translate the need for order into a requirement of dignity.
Courtroom decorum becomes an independent standard as judges
impose rules of dress, a mode of address, the requirement of
standing for the judge, and the demand that witnesses not use
offensive language. In United States v. Malone,61 several mem-
bers of a religious order of nuns refused to rise when the judge
entered. The nuns were held in contempt for while the court
lacked the power "to require.., purely ceremonial or symbolic
acts," the requirement of rising for the judge was found to serve
5 7 See generally E. DANcmL, CONTEMPT, § 199, 212 (1939).
58 Anonymous. Dyer 188b (note) (1688 reprint) cited and translated from law
French in 78 Eng. Rep. 416 n (1631) cited in Dobbs, supra note 49, at 187.
59 United States v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
60 In Allen, id the Court held that the right to be present at one's trial is
dependent on a willingness of the defendant not to engage in disruptive conduct.
The Court specifically recommended: (1) binding and gagging and (2) use of
the contempt power as additional methods to be used by judges to maintain court-
room order.
It may be that in cases of disruptive political defendants removal from the
courtroom with remote transmission of trial proceedings or placement of the
defendant in a soundproof isolation booth with piped in sound may be preferable
to use of the contempt power. The latter suggestion saw use in the trialof Adolf
Eichman in Israel for his involvement in Nazi atrocities. See H. AnENDT, ExICiNr
iN JERusALEm 5 (1965 rev. ed.).
61 United States v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1969).
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the function of reminding "all that attention must be concentrated
upon the business before the court,... and [that] there must be
silence.62
While it is true that certain conduct may be directly related
to an orderly trial, conduct required by the court may be so
remote as to demonstrate that the court is primarily interested
in preserving its dignity and symbolic importance.6 The con-
tempt citations of the defendants in the Chicago conspiracy
trial64 are replete with instances of citation and sentencing for
conduct which afforded effrontery to the court. Defendant Abbie
Hoffman was charged with twenty-four specific acts of contempt;
many of the specifications were for disrespectful conduct such as
blowing a kiss to the jury,6 5 three charges were based on his failing
to stand up when the judge entered the courtroom: "Specification
5: At the close of the morning session on October 29, the defendant
Hoffman refused to rise in the customary manner;" 6 "Specifica-
tion 6: On October 29, when the court was compelled to call a
recess during the afternoon session, the defendant Hoffman once
62 412 F.2d 848, 850.
6 3 See Dobbs, supra note 49, at 200-204.
64 United States v. Dellinger, supra note 31. See also Lukas, supra note 2, at
34-35:
[I]t ought to be stated clearly that the defendant's contempt when
it began was almost exclusively verbal. (No other aspect of the trial
aroused such widespread confusion. Afterwards, a friend asked me
which of the defendants had defecated in the aisle; I assured him none
of them had.) The judge spoke several times of the defendant's
"violence" in the courtroom. The only violence I witnessed occurred
on several occasions when the federal marshals used more than neces-
sary force to seat or lead away defendants (the defendants responsed
in kind, interposing a shoulder or hip between the marshals and their
prey, but they did not attack anyone.) The only other physicalaons" I recall were the tri al or symbolic: the attempt to bring a
birthday cake into the courtroom on Bobby Seale s birthday; the placingof the National Liberation Front and American flags on the defense table,
the wearing of judicial robes (unless you include the nonaction ofrefusing to stand.) The rest of the time the contempt was words-
irreverent disrespectful, harsh and even vlgar-but words.Finay, as Professor Harry Kalven of the University of Chicago has
pointed out, even this verbal contempt (as reflected in the contempt
citations) was by no means consistent throughout the trial. It tended to
bunch in periods of particular tension or confrontation, triggered by
specific events.
65 United States v. Dellinger, Official Trial Transcript at 9 cited in CHICAGo
CONTEMPIIT TRAISSCRnPT, supra note 35, at 115:Specification 1: On September 26, during the opening statement by
the Government, defendant Hoffman rose andblew a kiss to the jurors.
The contempt sentence for this conduct was one day.
66 United States v. Delinger, Ofbcial Trial Transcript at 4,728-729 cited in
C ONTEMPT TRANSChaIT, supra note 85, at 117.
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more refused to rise in the customary manner;"67 and "Specifica-
tion 7: On October 80, at the beginning of the court session, the
defendant Hoffman refused to rise in response to the marshal's
direction."6 8 Hoffman was sentenced to one day in prison for
each of these specifications. 9 To punish a defendant, particularly
a defendant in a political trial, for bad manners or offensive speech
results in the judge punishing symbolic and ritual conduct which
is considered to be a challenge to the dignity of the court but
which cannot be viewed as providing a serious impediment to the
functioning of the judicial system. While the defendant Hoffman's
refusal to stand may appear childish and profane, the conduct
hardly merits three days in prison.
There is growing recognition that a distinction must be made
between conduct which challenges the dignity of the court and
conduct which is obstructive; such recognition was evidenced in
the district court opinion in United States ex rel. Lynch v.
Werksman: 70
A United States Court... is not empowered to punish as
contempt any action or statement merely because it may dis-
play disrespect for the Court or because it recognizes that
judges, notwithstanding their high obligation to administer
justice in a fair and impartial manner, have mannerisms,
idiosyncracies, predispositions, and predilections that make
each judge somewhat unique in his handling of cases. If every
disrespectful comment of losing counsel and litigants were to
constitute criminal contempt, the prison population in the
United States would be substantially increased and the First
Amendment would have a substantial new exception to its
protection. For an action or statement that displays disrespect
for a court to constitute contempt, it must be of such character
that a finding can be made that the action in fact obstructs
the administration of justice.
At the outer limit, the use of contempt to punish disrespectful
statements or critical comments poses First Amendment prob-
67 United States v. Dellinger, Official Trial Transcript at 4,763 cited in
CHICAGO CONTEMPT TRANsCRIPT, supra note 35, at 117.
6sUnited States v. Dellinger, Offcial Trail Transcript at 4,801 cited in




lems. 71 Much short of such dangers, there should be concern that
contempt not be used as a device to punish political deviancy for
it is clear that certain contumacious conduct follows inevitably
from the view held by a significant segment of the alienated
citizenry that the judiciary and its demand for dignity is repres-
sive.
72
There is increasing support for the proposition that a distinc-
tion between obstructive and disrespectful conduct should be
made, and that the use of the contempt power should be confined
to the former type of conduct. There is evidence that the estab-
lished bar desires contempt proceedings to be confined to those
who actually interfere with orderly judicial proceedings. The
American College of Trial Lawyers' Committee on the Disruption
of the Judicial Process chaired by Whitney North Seymour and
including Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Simon H. Rifdnd and Edward
Bennett Williams as members, recommended a limited use of the
contempt power in their 1970 report:7' "The power of a judge
to punish contempt committed in his presence is not designed to
protect his own dignity or person, but to protect the rights of
litigants and the public by ensuring that the administration of
justice shall not be thwarted or obstructed." While the American
College of Trial Lawyers did not propose any reform of the
procedures for judging contempt, it most certainly favored a
limitation on the use of that power in a way which would have
great impact in the case of a political trial. The American Bar
Association's Advisory Committee on the Judge's Function issued
in 1970 an advanced report of recommendations for measures to
be employed in dealing with courtroom disorder. 4 The Advance
71 See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 290 (1941) where comments of Mr. Justice Brewer are cited with
approval:The time is past in the history of the world when any living man
or body of men [e was referring to the Supreme Court] can be set on
a pedestal and decorated with a halo. True, many criticisms may be, like
their authors, devoid of good taste, but better all sorts of criticism than no
criticism at all. The moving waters are full of life and health; only in
the still waters is stagnation and death.
See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964).72 See note 42 supra and accompanying text. See generally R. LiEBERT, RAm-
CAL AND MnrrrANr YoumH: A PsYcnoANALrnc INQtmY (1971).
73 American College of Trial Lawyer's Report, supra note 55, at 11. See gen-
erally Hazard, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 438 (1970).
74 American Bar Association Advisory Committee on the Judge's Function,
Standards Relating to the Judge's Role in Dealing With Trial Disruptions (An Ad-
(Continued on next page)
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Report in its limited approval of the use of contempt, implicitly
distinguished conduct which causes an obstruction from that
which effects indignity: "The trial judge has the power to cite,
and if necessary, punish summarily anyone who, in his presence
in open court, willfully obstructs the course of criminal pro-
ceedings."
75
The A.B.A. report, however, makes an even more significant
contribution to reform of the contempt power with its recom-
mendation for increased consideration of procedural safeguards
which offers an additional and significant approach to circumvent
judicial imposition on those considered to be guilty of effrontery
to the court. The report suggests the need for the maintenance
of impartiality: "The judge before whom courtroom misconduct
occurs may impose appropriate sanctions, including punishment
for contempt, but should refer the matter to another judge if his
conduct was so integrated with the contempt that he contributed
to it or was otherwise involved, or his objectivity can reasonably
be questioned."76 A first step in the development of procedural
safeguards for the contempt defendant is achieved by providing
an impartial presiding officer. A hearing by an independent
tribunal preserves the appearance of fairness; 77 and particularly
in the case where the trial judge has become involved in "ex-
changes" with counsel or where the judge is the target of the
contemptuous conduct, an uninvolved and independent judge pro-
vides some guarantee of an impartial adjudication of the con-
duct .7
The paradigmatic case of the application of the contempt
power in the context of the political trial is Sacher v. United
Statese9 which involved the summary contempt sentencing of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
vance Report of Part of Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge)
(1971). See generally Hazard, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 433 (1970).
75 Id. at 18.
761d. at 21.
77 See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954): "[Jlustice must satisfy
the appearance of justice."
78 See Offutt v. United States, 848 U.S. 11, 14 (1954):
The vital point is that in sitting in judgment of [the contempt
defendant] the judge should not himself give vent to personal grievance
. . . Accordingly, this Court has deemed it important that district judges
guard against this easy confusion by not sitting themselves in judgment
upon misconduct of counsel where the contempt charged is entangled
with the judge's personal feeling against the lawyer.
79 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). See also Yates v. United
States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
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defense counsel for eleven Communist Party leaders who were con-
victed of violating the Smith Act after a nine-month trial.8' The
presiding judge charged the lawyers and a layman acting as his
own lawyer with breaches of decorum and disobedience in the
presence of the judge after warnings. Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court finding that: "[tihe nature
of the deportment was not such as merely to offend personal
sensitivities of the judge, but it prejudiced the expeditious, orderly
and dispassionate conduct of the trial.""' The Court reasoned
that contempt of court inevitably involves offense against the
dignity and authority of the judge since at a trial "the Court is
so much the judge and the judge so much the court" that con-
tempt of one is contempt of the other; this being the case, the
Court ruled the summary power cannot be so restricted that it
would be limited to "such minor contempts as leave the judge
indifferent and may be evaded by adding heckling, abusive and
defiant conduct toward the judge as an individual."8 2 The Court
went on to reject the argument of the defendants: "A construction
of the Rule [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42] is ad-
vocated which would deny a judge power summarily to punish
a contempt that is personal to himself except, perhaps, at a mo-
ment when it is necessary to forestall abortion of the trial. His
only recourse, it is said, is to become an accuser or complaining
8 0 Dennis v. United States, 841 U.S. 494 (1951). Defendants were indicted
under Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§
10, 11. The defendants were convicted of willfully and knowingly conspiring (1)
to organize as the Communist Party of the United States of America a society,
group and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and
destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence, and
(2) knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of over-
throwing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and
violence. On review the United States Supreme Court concluded:
We hold that §§ 2(a)(1), 2(a)(3) and 3 of the Smith Act do not
inherently, or as construed or applied in the instant case, violate the
First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Bights, or the First
and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness. Petitioners intended
to overthrow the Government of the United States as speedily as the
circumstances would permit. Their conspiracy to organize the Communist
Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence created as "clear and present danger"
of an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence. They
were properly and constitutionally convicted for violation of the Smith
Act. The judgments of conviction are affirmed. Id. at 516-17.
But see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); and Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
81343 U.S. at 3.
82 343 U.S. at 12.
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witness before another judge.""' The Court held that Rule 42
permits the trial judge not only to invoke summary power to
immediately punish contemptuous conduct where he finds that
delay will prejudice the trial; but also to use the summary con-
tempt power where he decides to delay judgment for con-
temptuous conduct when he finds that postponement of the
contempt hearing to the close of the trial is in the best interest
of the court.84
Sacher, a five to three decision, provided the occasion for
notable dissenting opinions by Justices Black and Frankfurter.
Mr. Justice Black urged reversals on the ground that (1) the
trial judge should not have passed on the contempt charges he
preferred; (2) that guilt should not have been summarily decided
as it was without notice, without a hearing, and without an oppor-
tunity for petitioners to defend themselves, (8) that those charged
with contempt are constitutionally entitled to have their guilt or
innocence decided by a jury. Black made a significant behavorial
observation which is relevant to considering the use of contempt
in the context of the political trial and the need to provide
procedural safeguards for those accused of contempt:
The root of Judge Medina's charges was that these lawyers
followed a concerted course deliberately designed to bring the
whole judicial system into public contempt and disgrace.
Their clients were Communist leaders. Much of the 13,000
pages of evidence was offered to show that they planned to
subvert and destroy all governmental institutions including
courts. Unless we are to depart from high traditions of the
bar, evil purposes of their clients could not be imputed to
these lawyers whose duty it was to represent them with
fidelity and zeal. Yet from the very parts of the record which
Judge Medina specifies, it is difficult to escape the impression
that his inferences against the lawyers were colored, however
unconsciously, by his natural abhorrence for the unpatriotic
and treasonable designs attributed to their Communist leader
clients.85
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, placed greater emphasis
88343 U.S. at 11.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 19.
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on the necessary personal involvement of the judge who pre-
dictably is offended by contemptuous conduct and who must be
subject to temptation to involve himself in exchanges with the
contemnors. Frankfurter notes with concern the fact that the judge
was subjectively affronted by the conduct and that this affront
must have had an effect on his disposition of contempt charges.
Finding that the theme of personal affrontery "underlies the whole
certificate," Frankfurter responded that: "[iut conveys inescapably
what the judge deemed to have been the permeating significance
of the behavior of these lawyers." 86 A review of the record re-
vealed that "the conduct found contemptuous was in the main
directed against the trial judge personally and that the judge
himself so regarded it;" the trial judge himself regarded the con-
duct as a personal assault charging in the contempt citation that
the defendant's conduct had as its purpose the "impairing [of] my
health so that the trial could not continue."87 Frankfurter made a
SO Id. at 34. Frankfurter observes that: ". . . Ealt least seventy-nine of these
[specifications] describe conduct directed against the trial judge personally:
charges of prejudice and racial bias, of collusion with the prosecution, of headline-
seeking."
87 Id. at 33. Frankfurter cites with concern the acts of the defendants upon
which the trial judge concluded that he was the intended victim of the defen-
dant's contempt plan:
b. Suggested that various findings by the Court were made for the
purpose of newspaper headlines;
c. Insinuated that there was connivance between the Court and the
United States Attorney;
e. Persisted in making long, repetitious, and unsubstantial argument,
objections, and protests, working in shifts, accompanied by shouting,
sneering and snickering;
f. Urged one another on to badger the Court;
g. Repeatedly made charges against the Court of bias, prejudice,
corruption, and partiality;
h. Made a succession of disrespectful, insolent, and sarcastic com-
ments and remarks to the Court;
k. Persisted in asking questions on excluded subject matters, know-
ing that objections would be sustained, to endeavor to create a false
picture of bias and partiality on the part of the Court;
1. Accused the Court of racial prejudice without any foundation; and
m. Generally conducted themselves in a most provocative manner
in an endeavor to call forth some intemperate or undignified response
from the Court which could then be relied upon as a demonstration of
the Court's unfitness to preside over the trial.
For a comparison with the Chicago conspiracy trial, supra note 31, contempt
specifications. See CHECACO Coi rTrmT TRANsCaRIT, supra note 35, at 169-248.
See especially the remarks of Judge Hoffman at the sentencing of Mr. Kunstler:
Now, I know you, from some of the things you said here, tie in your
own personal beliefs with those of your clients, and you live your client's
cases as though they are your own.... But a man charged with a crime
(Continued on next page)
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second significant observation, and that was, that the judge him-
self is tempted to and often succumbs to involvement in exchanges
with controversial attorneys and defendants in a way that exacer-
bates the situation; the record was found to reveal "numerous
episodes involving the judge and defense counsel that are more
suggestive of an undisciplined debating society than of the hush
and solemnity of the court of justice. Too often counsel were
encouraged to vie with the court in dialectic, in repartee, and
banter, in talk so copious as inevitably to arrest the momentum
of the trial and to weaken the restraints that a judge should
engender in lawyers.""' From these two observations Frankfurter
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
has a right only to a defense properly made, and that does not include
what has gone on, the sort of thing that has gone on in this courtroom.
I am one of those who believes that crime, if it is on the
increase, and I don't have the statistics before me, in any jurisdiction,
state or federal, it is due in large part to the fact that waiting in the wings
are lawyers who are willing to go beyond, to go beyond professional
responsibility, professional rights, and professional duty in their defense
of a defendant, and that fact that a defendant or some defendants know
that such a lawyer is waiting in the wings, I think, has rather a stimu-
lating effect on the increase in crime. Id. at 207.
88 Id at 38. For comparison, see Chicago conspiracy trial, supra note 31,
Trial Transcript for October 15, 1969 at 2431 cited in THE CoNsPMcY TArML,
supra note 39, at 93-94:
MR. FORAN [Prosecutor]: Your Honor, that is outrageous. This man
is a mouthpiece. Look at him wearing an arm band like his clients,
your Honor. Any lawyer (who] comes into a courtroom and has no
respect for the Court and acts in conjunction with that kind of conduct
before the Court, your Honor, the Government protests his attitude
and would like to move the Court to make note of his conduct
before this court.
THE COURT: Note has been duly made on the record.
MR. KUNSTLER: Your Honor, I think the temper and tone of voice
and the expression on Mr. Foran's face speaks more thany any picture
could tell.
THE COURT: Mr. Kunster-
MR. FORAN: Of my contempt for Mr. Kunstler, your Honor.
MR. KUNSTLER: To call me a mouthpiece, and for your Honor not to
open his mouth and say that is not to be done in your court, I think
that violates the sanctity of this court. This is a word that your
Honor knows is contemptuous and contumacious.
THE COURT: Dodt tell me what I know.
MR. KUNSTLER: I am wearing an armband in memoriam to the dead,
your Honor, which is no disgrace in this country.
I want him admonished, your Honor. I request you to do that.
The word "mouthpiece" is a contemptuous term.
THE COURT: Did you say you want to admonish me?
MR. KUNSTLER: No, I want you to admonish him.
THE COURT: Let the record show I do not admonish the United States
Attorney because he was properly representing his client, the United
States of America.
MR. KUNSTLER: To call another attorney a mouthpiece and a disgrace
for wearing a black arm band-
(Continued on next page)
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concluded that severe limits must be put on the use of summary
contempt in order to afford the defendant desirable procedural
protections and the opportunity for a fair hearing:
[I]t is indubitably established that the judge felt deeply
involved personally in the conduct for which he punished
the defense lawyers. He was not merely a witness to an occur-
rence, as would be a judge who observed a fist fight in his
courtroom or brutal badgering of a witness or an impropriety
towards the jury. The judge acted as the prosecuting witness;
he thought of himself as such. His self-concern pervades the
record; it could not humanly have been excluded from his
judgment of contempt. Judges are human, and it is not sug-
gested that any other judge could have been impervious to
the abuse had he been subjected to it. But precisely because
a judge is human, and in common frailty or manliness would
interpret such conduct of lawyers as an attack on himself
personally, he should not subsequently sit in judgment on his
assailants, barring only instances where such extraordinary
procedure is compellingly necessary in order that the trial may
proceed and not be aborted. 9
The concerns evidenced by Mr. Justice Black and Frankfurter
become all the more compelling as the predictable behavior
pattern of the political activists and alienated demonstrator are
cast in the role of defendants. Moreover, the procedural reforms
suggested by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas in their
dissenting opinion are necessary protections if the courts are to
avoid the actual danger as well as injurious criticism, no matter
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
THE COURT: To place the flag of an enemy country-
MR. KUNSTLER: No, your Honor, there is no declared war.
MR. HAYDEN: Are you at war with Vietnam?
THE COURT: Any country-
Let that appear on the record also. Bring in the jury. I don't want-
MR. KUNSTLER: Are you turning down my request after this disgraceful
episode? You are not going to say anything?
THE COURT: I not only turn it down, I ignore it.
MR. KUNSTLER: That speaks louder than words, too, your Honor.
THE COURT: And let that appear of record, the last words of Mr.
Kunstler, and Miss Reporter, be very careful to have them in the
record.
The last four statements were cited by the judge as contempt specification number
2 in Trial Transcript at 2,485 cited in CaICACO CoNTEM11T TRANSCRIPT, supra
note 85, at 178. The sentence of Mr. Kunstler for these latter remarks was 14 days
in prison.
89 343 U.S. at 35.
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how ill-founded, that they play a role as agents of political repres-
sion. There is a series of specific procedural reforms which: (a)
may confine the use of the contempt power to those cases where
the actual functioning of the court is threatened and (b) will
insure an impartial determination and the appearance of fairness.
These reforms include: (1) a warning to the offender; (2) spe-
cificity in the citation of contemptuous conduct; (3) trial by an
independent judge; (4) and the provision of a jury trial.
Certainly, a judge should warn that certain conduct may
occasion contempt citation. While it may be that some language
is to be considered per se insolent and contemptuous; in a day of
fiery rhetoric and with increasing acceptance of street jargon
into common discourse, there should be some hesitancy in citing
language as contemptuous without warning. It is notable that dur-
ing the Chicago conspiracy trial Judge Hoffman did not cite the
defendants for contempt during the trial nor did he warn them
that their conduct was to provide the basis for a later adjudication;
only at the close of the trial did the judge produce a lengthy
series of specifications against each defendant and defense coun-
sel. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has been quite explicit in
its suggestion for citation and warning at the time of offense;
immediate note should be made in the record of what conduct
gave rise to the contempt and of the surrounding circumstances:
"If there was such obstruction resulting from what respondent
said, that should be ascertained from the record of what occurred
at the time. Citation for direct contempt should not be delayed
for months. It should spring fresh from the alleged obstruction
of the court's performance of its judicial duty, although adjudica-
tion and punishment might well await the convenience of the
court's business." 0 A warning at the time of the contumacious
conduct provides the dual purpose (1) of satisfying the record
and (2) of giving notice to the defendant so that he might con-
sider the circumstances as they will be later relevant to his
defense and (3) so that he may be warned that his conduct has
been considered obstructive so that he might control his conduct
or language so as to avoid further citation.
When conduct or language does occasion contempt citation,




the judge should note with specificity what conduct and language
occasions the contempt order.91 This problem is illustrated by the
summary contempt proceedings of Daniel Taylor in Common-
wealth of Kentucky v. Tinsley et. al.92 The Court after observing:
"It's a shame this court has to do something that the Bar Associa-
tion of this State should have done a long time ago,"93 ruled on
the attorney's contemptuous conduct with no more specificity
than the following:
I have you nine counts. First Count, 30 days in jail; Second
Count, 60 days in jail; Third Count, 90 days in jail; Fourth
Count, six months in jail; Fifth Count, six months in jail;
Seventh Count, six months in jail; Eight Count, one year in
jail; Ninth Count, one year in jail, all to run consecutive. Take
him away.94
Generally criminal proceedings are initiated by an indictment
or an information which gives notice to the defendant of the
offense charge, citing the offense and describing with some par-
ticularity the essential facts of the offense charged.9 5 For a con-
91 See generally, Harper & Haber, Lawyer Troubles in Political Trials, 60 YALE
L.J. 1 (1951).
92 Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Tinsley, No. 144805 (Jefferson Cir-
cuit, Crim., 2nd Div., filed June 9, 1971. Contempt Order filed October 29,
1971. See also Finley, Judge Hays lists contempt charges against lawyer Taylor,
cuts sentence, Louisville Courier-Journal, March 7, 1972, at B14, col. 1. The trial
judge (in accordance with an order of the Kentucky Court of Appeals) filed a
corrected judgment providing specific references to the conduct which occasioned
the contempt, reduced all sentences to six months or less, and submitted the entire
trial record to the Kentucky Court of Appeals in order to present for review the
circumstances which gave rise to he contempt citation. Corrected Judgment and
Certificate of Contemptuous Action in the presence of the trial court were filed
March 2, 1972.
93 Id., Transcript of Proceedings of Contempt Charges Against Daniel Taylor,
October 29, 1971 at 2.
94 Id. at 3. Compare CHICAco CONTEMT TsANscnn'T, supra note 35, where
the judge numbers each specification recounting the surrounding circumstances
and citing with particularity the language or conduct which gave rise to the
contempt. However, Judge Hoffman often did not specify which part of sometimes
lengthy exchanges of dialogue gave rise to the contempt.
95 See Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that:
The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged. It shall be signed by the attorney for the government. It need
not contain a formal commencement, a formal conclusion or any other
matter not necessary to such statement. Allegations made in one count
may be incorporated by reference in another count. It may be alleged
in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed the
offense are unknown or that he committed it by one or more specified
means. The indictment or information shall state for each count the
(Continued on next page)
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tempt defendant to answer charges and to prepare a petition for
review, more specificity in the charges would provide both notice
and a record for review. While a notation in the record may
satisfy the need for warning and provide a basis for determining
from the surrounding circumstances whether there was actual
obstruction, the contempt citation itself should note the contempt
charges with sufficient specificity so that the citation amounts to
notice on its face. If a contempt citation is to have any deterrent
value to others, there is a need to identify precisely what conduct
is intolerable in judicial proceedings. While this problem has
been somewhat alleviated in the federal system by the adoption
of court rules and the exercise of the court's supervisory power,96
if the requirement of notice to contempt defendants is to be
evenly applied it may be desirable to find this protection within
the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
9 7
The requirement that an impartial judge hear contempt
charges was, to a great extent, recognized in Mayberry v. Pennsyl-
vania,"' where the defendant was charged on eleven counts of
contempt. Many of the words leveled at the judge were highly
personal aspersions including "dirty sonofabitch," "dirty tyrannical
old dog," "stumbling dog" and "fool." The defendant charged
the judge with running "a Spanish Inquisition" and told the judge
to "Go to Hell" and "Keep your mouth shut." Finding that:
"[i]nsults of that kind are apt to strike at the most vulnerable and
human qualities of a judge's temperament," the Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
(Footnote continued -from preceding page)
official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other pro-
vision of law which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in
the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indict-
ment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission
did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.
See also Rule 6.10 of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.96 In the federal system this is a problem somewhat alleviated by the require-
ment of Fed. R. Crim. P. § 42(a) which requires that specifications of contempt
be included in the contempt certificate. In United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416,
430-53 (2d Cir. 1950) certain of Judge Medina's specifications were found too
vague by the Court of Appeals.
97 Once it is recognized that: "Eclonvictions for criminal contempt are indis-
tinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for their impact on the individual
defendant is the same." Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968); then all
fundamental due process rights must attach: "A person's right to reasonable
notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a
right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence. In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948).
98 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
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in criminal contempt cases a trial before a judge other than the
one reviled by the contemnor; before a judge "not bearing the
sting of these slanderous remarks and having the impersonal
authority of the law."99
The Supreme Court has extended the requirement that an
impartial judge try not only contempt charges where the trial
judge has personally involved himself in exchanges with the
contemnor but also contempt charges where the judge is simply
the victim of a personal attack.10 It would seem, then, that the
value of impartiality and the appearance of fairness should require
trial by an independent judge in all cases unless some counter-
vailing value can be shown as to why summary proceedings
should be permitted.10' Efficiency and immediacy are often cited
as the benefits of summary proceedings.0 2 This argument, how-
ever, is not convincing where the summary contempt proceed-
ings occur at the end of a trial. At best summary proceedings
should be limited to those occasions where an order from the
bench during a trial is made in order to bring an end to the
contemptuous conduct and to facilitate an orderly continuation
of the trial. An impartial judge should be required in all but the
restricted cases of summary proceedings.
Finally, it would seem that a jury trial should be required in
all contempt proceedings if courts are to be free from the charge
of being oppressive and self-serving in the use of the contempt
power. The requirement of jury trials in contempt proceedings
was to some extent established by Bloom v. IllinoiWs03 where the
Court "recognized the potential for abuse in exercising the sum-
mary power to imprison for contempt-it is an 'arbitrary' power
which is 'liable to abuse.' '[I]ts exercise is a delicate one and
09 Id. at 466.100 See Offutt v. United States 348 U.S 11, 14 (1954): "The vital point is
that in sitting in judgment. . . Eot a contempt defendant] the judge should not
himself give vent to personal spleen or respond to a personal grievance .... "
10 Id. "These are subtle matters for they concern the ingredients of what
constitutes justice. Therefore, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
30 2 In approving of summary contemt proceedings in Sacher v. United States,
343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952) the court observed: "'summary . . . refers to a procedure
which dispenses with the formality delay and digression that would result from
... all that goes with a conventional court trial."
103 391 U.S. 194 (1968). See also Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373
(1966) where the Court, on the basis of its supervisory power over federal courts
held that where a contempt sentence was more than a petty sentence, the federal
court was required to grant a jury trial. A six month sentence was suggested as
the dividing line between petty and serious offenses.
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care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions." 1 0 4
The Court held that: "serious contempts are so nearly like other
serious crimes that they are subject to the jury trial provisions
of the Constitution, now binding on the States, and that the
traditional rule is constitutionally infirm insofar as it permits other
than petty contempts to be tried without honoring a demand for
a jury trial."'-" Nevertheless the requirement of a jury trial is
limited to cases of "serious contempts" and the notion of "serious
contempt" is one dependent on the penalty assessed for the
contemptuous conduct; at the present time, by definitions a serious
contempt is one bringing a sentence of six months or more.10 6
There is of course an element of arbitrariness in the Supreme
Court's definition of serious crime which hangs on the six month
penalty. The problem, however, is exacerbated with the applica-
tion of the "six month" rule to a series of successive contempts
where no one charge exceeds six months but where the cumulative
sentence runs into years. This was the case in the Chicago trial'
07
where defendant Kunstler received a sentence of over four years
but with no single charge exceeding six months. 08 The contempt
proceedings in the case of Kunstler were before the trial judge
who cited the contempt and were summary and without a jury.
The application of the Bloom requirement of a jury in "serious"
contempt cases seems to be frustrated by an application of the
104 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968) [citations omitted].
105 Id. at 198.
106 Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) provides authority for the
standard of "petty" sentences for contempt is a sentence of up to six monthsi jail
In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 891 U.S. 216 (1968), sentences shorter
than six months were under Cheff, considered to be "petty." The standard of"petty" punishment appears to be derived from 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), which
provides in part: "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed
sonnt for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500 or
107 Uinited States v. Dellinger supra note 31.
108 See The Conspiracy Trial, supra note 39, at 614-615. Contempt citations
and sentences for William Kunstler were as follows:
Specification Sentence Specification Sentence Specification Sentence
1 1 month 9 21 days 17 4 months
2 14 days 10 14 days 18 1 month
3 3 months 11 7 days 19 1 month
4 14 days 12 14 days 20 6 months
5 14 days 13 14 days 21 6 months
6 3 month 14 1 month 22 4 months
7 8 months 15 21 days 23 1 month
8 6 months 16 2 months 24 2 months
Total sentence for contempt: 4 years, 13 days.
[Vol. 60
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rule which would permit a judge to cumulate contempt offenses
and then to apply a sentence far in excess of the six month limit
suggested by Bloom. Perhaps, the best rule would be to require a
jury trial in all contempt cases. The guarantee of impartiality
and freedom from judicial oppression, as well as the appearance
of fairness, would all be best served by full recognition of the
Sixth Amendment requirement in all criminal contempt pro-
ceedings of a trial "by an impartial jury." This could be accom-
plished within the existing "due process" requirement of jury trial
in the case of serious offenses by recognizing that the penalty
available in contempt cases may be far in excess of the six month
"petty" punishment limit."1 9 Criminal contempt should be recog-
nized as a serious offense itself, and where an individual is subject
to loss of liberty for such an offense, the full protection trial by
jury should be afforded.
Contempt of court as a device to punish those who would
prevent the orderly functioning of the courts cannot be denied.
Nor can it be denied that there is great potential for abuse in such
a powerful legal theory. It is, however, in the context of the
political trial that the dangers of misuse and misunderstanding
are greatest and hence provide the need for the fullest procedural
protections. This point was made by Mr. Justice Douglas in his
concurring opinion in Illinois v. Allen"0 where the contempt
power was cited as a legitimate restraining mechanism available
to the judiciary. Agreeing that criminal trials cannot take place
in bedlam, Douglas observed:
Our real problems of this type lie not with this case but with
other kinds of trials. First are the political trials. They fre-
I0 9 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Here the Court held that
the fact that a six month sentence was imposed for an offense was not dispositive
if a greater penalty could have been imposed: "Louisiana's final contention is
that even if it must grant jury trials in serious criminal cases, the conviction before
us is valid, and constitutional because here the petitioner was sentenced to only
60 days in the parish prison. We are not persuaded.... [T]he penalty authorized
for a particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether it is serious or
not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the
Sixth Amendment.... The penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be
taken "as a guage of its social and ethical judgments ... " In the case before us
the Legislature of Louisiana has made simple battery a criminal offense punishable
by imprisonment for two years and a fine. The question, then is whether a crime
carryin such a penalty is an offense which Louisiana may insist on trying without
a jury. Id. at 159-60.
110 397 U.S. 337 (1969). See text accompaning notes 59-60.
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quently recur in our history and as they take place in federal
courts we have broad supervisory powers over them. That is
one setting where the question arises whether the accused
has rights of confrontation that the law invades at its peril.
In Anglo-American law, great injustices have at times been
done to unpopular minorities by judges, as well as by prose-
cutors .... Would we tolerate removal of a defendant from
the courtroom during a trial because he was insisting on his
constitutional rights, albeit vociferously, no matter how ob-
noxious his philosophy might have been to the bench that tried
him? Would we uphold contempt in that situation?
Problems of political indictments and of political judges
raise profound questions going to the heart of the social com-
pact. For that compact is two sided: majorities undertake to
press their grievances within limits of the Constitution and in
accord with its procedures; minorities agree to abide by con-
stitutional procedures in resisting those claims.
Does the answer to that problem involve defining the pro-
cedure for conducting political trials or does it involve the
designing of constitutional methods of putting an end to
them?1
11
It might be well to put an end to political trials. It may, however,
be utopian to believe that political trials can be eliminated from
human society. Once men gather together and organize, govern-
ment is inevitable. Once power is rested in government, opposi-
tion is natural. Given opposing political factions, the political
trial arises as one device to maintain the status quo.
If political trials are inevitable, then perhaps the most that
can be achieved is an opportunity for a fair and impartial trial
by a jury. It is in the interest of the courts themselves, moreover,
to minimize the recriminations that follow in the wake of a
political indictment-to remain a tribunal and to avoid becoming
a temple. For this reason, courts should limit the use of contempt
to those occasions where their actual functioning is impaired. And
once the decision is made to employ the contempt power, it
should be done fairly and impartially with all the protections that
due process can provide.




The courts have long been called upon to hear prosecutions of
persons accused of committing "political" crimes against the state,
and to preside over prosecutions which were politically motivated.
In recent times, political trials have involved activist and alienated
defendants who reject and are hostile to established political power,
including the courts. There is an inevitability about the conduct
of these defendants which the courts necessarily deem insolent
and insulting which creates doubt as to the application of the
traditionally recognized contempt power. Disrespectful conduct
must be distinguished from obstructive conduct if the courts are
to avoid punishing individuals for their ideology and life style.
If impartiality and the appearance of fairness are to characterize
the courts, procedural safeguards must be provided to those
accused of contumacious and obstructive conduct. Due process
should require that a contempt defendant be warned of the
offense of his conduct, be provided with specific charges where
he is to be tried, and to be heard before an impartial judge and
tried by a jury. The procedural protections will not bring an end
to political trials but they offer some promise of protection to the
citizen and some hope that the courts may remain free of the
taint of political oppression.
IV. POSTSCRIPT
The Chicago conspiracy case 112 has provided the occasion for
blending together the various strains of authority which would
limit and procedurally confine the use of criminal contempt. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in two
opinions: United States v. Seale"' and United States v. Del-
linger,"4 applied the authority discussed above, to require trial
before another judge where the defendant is cited for past con-
112 United States v. Dellinger [No. 69 Crim. 180 S.D. Ill., Sept. 26, 1969].
113 United States v. Seale [No. 18246 Seventh Cir., May 11, 1972]. See 11
Ca.L. 2164 (May 24, 1972).
114 United States v. Dellinger [No. 18294 Seventh Cir., May 11, 1972]. See 11
CR.L. 2166 (May 24, 1972). To a large extent the court's opinion is concerned
with the conduct of counsel and the limits to be placed on rigorous advocacy.
The court does, however, direct itself to the question of symbolic or ceremonial
behavior to be required of defendants.
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duct 15 constituting a personal attack on the judge and to re-
quire trial before a jury where a single contempt charge is
penalized by a six months sentence or where there are suc-
cessive contempt citations which when cumulated exceed a
six months sentence limitation." 6 The Seventh Circuit found the
alleged abuse committed by the defendants, if proved, to be by its
nature personally offensive to the judge; and therefore, required
in such a case that an independent trial judge determine the
validity of the contempt citation. The court rejected the argument
that summary action could be justified in any situation other than
where the instant trial is in progress and the contempt power is
utilized to facilitate its continuance.
The Seventh Circuit noted the difficulty of applying the Sixth
Amendment requirement of the right to trial by jury to cases of
"serious criminal contempts" given the absence of a statutorily
authorized maximum penalty. The court concluded that one
must look to the penalty imposed to determine whether a jury
trial should be required: "[i]f the penalty actually imposed exceeds
six months imprisonment, the maximum sentence for 'petty of-
fense' under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1, the contempt is serious and a jury
trial must be afforded." 7 The application of this requirement led
115 See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text
In the case of Seale, the government conceded that the conduct constituted "an
insolent, personal attack on the judge." In Dellinger, supra note 114, however,
the court cites Sacher, supra note 79, for the proposition that a distinction can be
made between contumacious conduct generally and conduct which is "apt to strike
at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judges temperament." While
Offutt, supra note 77, holding that trial by another judge is required where the
presiding judge has become embroiled in conflict with the defendant, and May-
berry, supra note 98, requiring the same disposition where the judge is the victim
of an attack, have substantially eroded Sacher the court regarded it as retaining
some vitality. But see note 5 of the courts opinion in Dellinger where authority
is cited for disqualification in all cases of delayed contempt. Interestingly enough,
the court cites conduct by counsel and statement by the presiding judge which
are considered the basis for application of Mayberry, statement and conduct which
are strikingly similar to that discussion in Sacher which were not considered a
sufficient basis for requiring disqualification. Compare notes 86-87, supra with
language cited by the court in Dellinger at 1: "Throughout this case ... the
behavior of the defendants was aimed at baiting the judge and inciting and
harassing the U.S. Attorney in an attempt to stop the trial;" and Dellinger at 8;
"MR. KUNSTLER: 'I have sat here for four anda half months and watched the
objections denied and sustained by your Honor, and I know that this is not a fair
trial. I know it in my heart. I have to lose my license to practice law and if I
have to go to jail, I can't think of a better cause to go to jail for and to lose my
license for. .."'
116 See Bloom v. Illinois, supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text. See
also Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
"17 United States v. Seale [No. 18246 Seventh Cir., May 11, 1972] at 6-7.
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the court to conclude that successive citations of contempt with a
cumulative sentence necessitates the provision of a jury trial.
Nevertheless, the court left open the possibility of successive con-
tempts cited and punished summarily during a continuing trial
where no one penalty exceeded six months but where the cumula-
tive sentence might be greater than six months: "where con-
temptuous conduct is cited and punished instantly, we think the
punishment assessed for that conduct may be considered sep-
arately in determining the right to a jury trial."""8 The possibility
for judicial abuse of the summary contempt power, then, remains.
Seeking to lay down "neutral principles" for the use of the con-
tempt power, the Seventh Circuit directly rejected the argument
that there may be need for special rules of contempt for "political
trials": "[T]he standards of proper courtroom decorum are not
altered and should not be applied differently because a trial may
be characterized as political or because improprieties may be said
to spring forth as if a 'natural human response'."" 9 Nevertheless,
the standards for "legally sufficient specifications" go far in pro-
viding substantive principles for limiting the use of contempt as a
"political crime"; moreover, the utilization of the jury as a device
to provide contemporary content for the judicially developed
standards offers the political defendant the broadest latitude for
vindication short of a direct prohibition on the use of contempt
power in special circumstances defined either judicially or legis-
latively.
The court found necessary a requirement that a defendant be
warned that his conduct may be contemptuous; "an absence of
any warning that borderline conduct is regarded as contumacious
could be fatal to a contempt citation therefor."120 In defining the
level of intent required for contemptuous conduct to be criminal
the court struck middle ground, rejecting both the contention that
it be the product of a "vicious will" or a "culpable intent to ob-
struct justice" and the contention that the actor merely "know
118 Id. at 11.
119 Id. at 36. In Dellinger the court cites with approval a statement of Judge
Breital in Katz v. Murtagh, 321 N.Y.S.2d 104, 269 N.E.2d 816, 820 (1971):
[Tihe court is not a public hall for the expression of views, nor is it a
political arena or a street. It is a place for trial of defense issues in ac-
cordance with law and rules of evidence with standards of demeanor for
court, jurors, parties, witnesses and counsel.
12o Id. at 29.
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what he is doing so that his misconduct does not occur by accident,
inadvertence or other innocent reason."12' Rather the court held
that: "The minimum requisite intent is better defined as a voli-
tional act done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware
that his conduct is wrongful."1 22 The court left great latitude to
the trial judge in defining the standards of conduct to be required
in a given court: "The particular standards of demeanor for each
participant in a court of law or in connection with judicial pro-
ceedings have become solidified in tradition and do not need
elaboration here. We leave their articulation to the judge pre-
siding on remand and their application to the conduct in question
to the trier of fact."'23 It is in its resort to jury determination
of whether conduct or language should be punished by the con-
tempt power that the court introduces the device which may
provide protection for the radical and alienated political actor
who finds himself in court; the court observed "that language
patterns and word choice vary greatly between diverse social,
ethnic, economic and political groups. It is manifest that words
scarcely used by some persons may be every-day language to
many people who appear in courts. While these differences are
relevant to the inquiry into intent, there can be little doubt that
the jury is best suited to resolve this question."
24
The court accepted the distinction that the contempt power is
reserved for conduct which is obstructive and should not be
extended to cover conduct which is merely offensive. Neverthe-
less, the court noted: "Obstruction is an elusive concept which
does not lend itself to general statements. The tendency has
been for courts to treat each case on its individual facts and there
are, therefore, few decisions which aid in the determination of
the proper standards for the jury in this case." 2 The court again
strikes for the middle ground rejecting both a strict standard of
"material and substantial" and the broad principle that any inter-
ruption be punishable where it "diverts the judge's attention from
the orderly dispatch of the trial." 2 Rather, the court requires
121 Id. at 32-33.
122 Id. at 33.
123 Id. at 30.
124 Id. at 36. [emphasis added].
125 Id. at 33.
126 Id. The court finds itself unable to resolve the tension between insult and
(Continued on next page)
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that there be an "actual obstruction of justice" and in effect an
"immediate interruption" of the court's business, and that the
obstruction be "clearly shown." 1 27 In delineating the narrow "line
between insult and obstruction" the court cited with approval
the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in In re
Little128 and concluded that: "The Supreme Court seems to have
expressed a high degree of tolerance in distinguishing disrespect
from obstruction. A showing of imminent prejudice to a fair and
dispassionate proceeding is, therefore, necessary to support a
contempt based upon mere disrespect or insult."
29
The court in applying this standard found that as a matter of
law certain conduct cited was not sustainable as contempt be-
cause "regardless of the intent with which the conduct was
engaged in, no actual, material obstruction occurred which would
warrant imposition of the contempt sanction." 130 With regard to
(Footnote continued -from preceding page)
obstruction even with regard to such symbolic conduct as rising for the judge, see
notes 61-69, supra. The court draws a meaningless distinction in Dellinger, supra
note 114 at 17, between rising at the beginning of a session and end of a recess from
other times when rising is required:
Brief mention, however, must be made concerning the specifications
which deal with the appellant's refusals to stand when the court was con-
vened and recessed. It is our opinion that such symbolic acts, when not
coupled with further disturbance or disruption, might not rise to the level
of an actual and material obstruction of the judicial process. . . . While
the per curium opinion in Malone concluded that a court may require
such rising and while we reaffirm that conclusion as to rising at the
beginning of a session and end of a recess we believe on remand some
of the failures to rise here could be found nonobstructive.
127 Id. at 33-34.
128 Id. at 34-35 citing In re Little, 92 S.Ct. 659, 660 (1972) where the Court
evidences reticence in finding language contumacious.
The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the
power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute
an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice.
The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately
imperil. . . . [T]he law of contempt is not made for the protection of
judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are
supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.
129 Id. at 35.
130 Id. at 37. An example of contempt specification found insufficient is charge
number 2 in the case of Bobby G. Seale [United States v. Seale, No. 69 CR 180,
S.D. Ill. Certificate of Contempt November 5, 1969, Specification No. 2] pro-
viding:
During the morning session on October 14, 1969, while the Court, Mr.
Schultz and Mr. Weinglass were engaged in a colloquy, the defendant
Seale interrupted Mr. Weinglass and the following occurred (Tr. 2206):
MR. SEALE: Hey you don't speak for me, I would like to speak in be-
half of my own self and have my counsel handle my case in behalf of
myself.
How come I can't speak in behalf of myself? I am my own legal counsel
I don't want these lawyers to represent me. (Continued on next page)
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those specifications which are not clearly insufficient, the court
remanded the matter for a jury determination of sufficiency: "At
the hearing on remand, the jury must consider these elements as
the factual setting is unfolded before it. With respect to those
specifications remanded, the jury must consider the factual ques-
tions bearing on misbehavior, obstruction and on intent."' 31 The
jury then remains the ultimate arbiter of what conduct shall be
punishable under the contempt power.
The Seventh Circuit in the Seale and Dellinger cases has syn-
thesized recent Supreme Court decisions into a procedural rule
requiring an independent judge to preside over cases involving
citation for past contempt involving personal attack on the
presiding judge and requiring a jury trial where the cumu-
lative penalty arising from citation for contempt exceeds six
months. The power to summarily cite and punish contempt
remains but is restricted to decisions made in ongoing trials. The
legal standard and recent commentary directed at distinguishing
obstruction from insult is vitalized in the prospect of the jury
bringing contemporary standards of conduct and speech to bear
in order to determine whether within in a given context the de-
fendant is properly to be held in contempt of court. This con-
textual analysis of conduct offers promise that the contempt power
may be utilized in terms of "rules of order" rather than in a "rubric
of sacrilege."
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
THE COURT: You have a lawyer of record and he has been of record
here since the 24th.
MR. SEALE: I have been arguing that before the jury heard one shred
of evidence. I don't want these lawyers because I can take up my own
legal defense and my lawyer is Charles Carry.
THE COURT: I direct you, sir, to remain quiet.
MR. SEALE: And just be railroaded?
THE COURT: Will you remain quiet?
MR. SEALE: I want to defend myself, do you mind please?
THE COURT: Let the record show that the defendant Seale continued
to speak after the court courteously requested him to remain quiet.
131 Id. at 37.
